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Can Congress Use Its War Powers to Protect Military 
Employees from State Sovereign Immunity? 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch∗ 
The need to attract and keep soldiers has never been greater, yet that 
necessity is threatened by the Supreme Court’s burgeoning state sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence.  Congress has sought to promote military service 
in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
(“USERRA”), which protects soldiers from adverse employment actions 
based on their military status.  Although USERRA is clearly intended to 
apply to state employers, the Court’s dicta that Congress cannot abrogate 
state sovereign immunity under Article I of the Constitution appear to 
emasculate that aim.  This Article, however, argues that the Court’s recent 
holdings show that USERRA’s abrogation, enacted pursuant to Congress’s 
war powers, is an exception to the general prohibition against abrogation 
under Article I.  The validity of war powers abrogation is supported by the 
historical importance of a unified national defense—well recognized 
during the plan of the Constitutional Convention and by the Court 
itself—which reveals that the states did not expect to possess immunity 
where the federal government exercises its war powers.  This issue is 
important, for, as this Article details, few suitable alternatives exist for 
military personnel who are deprived of their USERRA rights by state 
employers.  Indeed, unless war abrogation is upheld, or Congress acts to 
secure conditional waivers of state immunity, military employees in only a 
few states will have the level of protection deemed necessary by Congress. 
The use of noncareer military personnel for active duty 
assignments has become more prevalent as the United States has 
both reduced the number of full-time soldiers and increased its 
military involvement throughout the world.  Indeed, to address the 
conflict in Iraq, as well as threats in Afghanistan, North Korea, and 
other parts of the world, the United States placed over 300,000 
members of the Reserves and National Guard on active duty since 
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September 11, 2001.1  The soldiers being called up now are also 
facing increased time on active duty, with current predictions of two 
years.2  Moreover, unlike soldiers in earlier conflicts,3 those who 
eventually leave active duty and return to civilian life now face an 
additional hardship: the Supreme Court’s burgeoning state sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence, which has greatly expanded the power of 
state employers to avoid liability under many federal employment 
statutes, even where Congress expressly permitted private lawsuits 
against states.4 
At a time when the nation is increasing its use of noncareer 
 
 1 Kristen Downey, Reservists Filing Complaints, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at E11 
(stating that 306,000 members of the Reserves and National Guard had been called 
to active duty).  As of November 26, 2003 the Department of Defense had 132,667 
members of the Reserves or National Guard on active duty.  See News Release, Dep’t 
of Def., National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of Nov. 26, 2003, at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031125-0704.html (last visited Mar. 
9, 2004); see also USERRA Legal Inquiries Up Regarding Jobs; DOL Says Possible Rise in 
Claims Expected, 63 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-12 (Apr. 2, 2003) [hereinafter 
USERRA Legal Inquiries Up] (stating that over 280,000 people have been called to 
active duty since September 2001); Associated Press, Pentagon Lost Track of Reservists, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2003, at A4 (stating that about 300,000 reservists had been 
called to active duty since September 11, 2001); Thomas E. Ricks & Vernon Loeb, 
Unrivaled Military Feels Strains of Unending War, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at A18 
(describing the strains felt by soldiers who are often required to go on back-to-back 
deployments, the decreasing number of active duty members of the armed forces, 
and the increased number of military interventions over the past decade).  The Army 
Chief of Staff estimated before fighting began in the second Iraqi conflict that the 
military will need “several hundred thousand” soldiers in Iraq after the conflict ends, 
although the Pentagon subsequently disagreed, putting the number as 100,000.  See 
Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force’s Size, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2003, at A1 (noting estimate by Gen. Erik K. Shinseki).  The Pentagon’s 
most recent estimate is that 156,000 United States soldiers will be needed in Iraq 
through at least 2004.  See Vernon Loeb, Pentagon Unveils Plan to Bolster Forces in Iraq, 
WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at A8.  Further, the most recent Department of Defense 
statistics show that there are 1,236,000 members of the Reserves or National Guard, 
and 1,385,116 active members of the armed services.  See DEP’T OF DEF., SELECTED 
MANPOWER STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 18, 155 (noting numbers as of September 
30, 2001), available at http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/m01/fy01/m01fy01.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2004). 
 2 See Robert Burns, Reserves May Get Alert on Iraq War (Nov. 19, 2002) (estimating 
that from 185,000 to 285,000 reservists would be required), available at 
http://www.cqservices.com/MyCQ/News/Default.asp?V=2121 (last visited Mar. 9, 
2004); Vernon Loeb & Steve Vogel, Reserve Tours Are Extended, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 
2003, at A1 (describing order that reservists and Guard members called to active duty 
must serve twelve months on the ground in Iraq or nearby, and that the tours may be 
extended to two years). 
 3 During the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, over 265,000 reservists were called to 
active duty.  See National Guard Association of the United States website, Major 
National Guard Callups (stating that 265,322 reservists were called), at 
http://www.ngaus.org/newsroom/guard101-callups.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). 
 4 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
  
2004 WAR POWERS 1001 
personnel and deploying them for longer periods of time, the Court’s 
state immunity decisions threaten the federal government’s ability to 
attract, and keep, such soldiers.  That goal underlies the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 
which guarantees leaves of absence for training, provides the right to 
reemployment after active duty, and prohibits discrimination based 
on an employee’s military status.5  Although the need for USERRA is 
growing,6 its ability to further the nation’s military needs by 
protecting military employees7 may be undermined if the Court 
permits states to avoid liability under the Act by invoking their 
sovereign immunity.8 
 
 5 See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (describing USERRA’s statutory 
purposes). 
 6 See USERRA Legal Inquiries Up, supra note 1, at A-12 (stating that USERRA 
complaints have increased by about thirty percent since the increase in callups after 
September 11, 2001—a percentage comparable to the increase after the 1991 Persian 
Gulf conflict); see also Official Says DOL Receiving Fewer USERRA Complaints Than Period 
After 1991 Gulf War, 221 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-12 (Nov. 17, 2003) (stating that 
the Department of Labor received 1,315 USERRA complaints during fiscal year 2003, 
compared to 2,500 complaints in fiscal year 1991); Downey, supra note 1, at E11 
(noting that the approximately 1,300 complaints in fiscal year 2003 was up from nine 
hundred complaints in 2001). 
 7 This Article refers to military service members who are working, or seeking 
work, in civilian positions as “military employees.” 
 8 Recent congressional statements made on behalf of a 1998 amendment to 
USERRA emphasized the importance of protecting state military employees.  See infra 
notes 222-23 and accompanying text (describing amendment that sought to ensure 
USERRA’s enforcement against state employers); see also 144 CONG. REC. H1396, 
H1398-99 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Filner) (stating that because 
“members of the Reserve and National Guard are a critical component of our 
national defense,” Congress should pass bill that restores USERRA protection to state 
employees after Seminole Tribe).  For example, Rep. Evans made clear the importance 
of fully protecting state military employees’ rights under USERRA: 
Federal law must assure that the appropriate remedies are available 
when violations of [USERRA] threaten our Nation’s ability to obtain 
and attract a strong military force. . . .  By passing [the amendment 
ensuring protection for state employees] we are fulfilling our duty to 
provide for the common defense of our Nation . . . [and] we are 
fulfilling our Constitutional duty to “provide for the common Defence” 
of our nation.  With the need to utilize the resources of the National 
Guard and Reserves to meet our Total Force military responsibilities, it 
is essential that those who volunteer to serve our country be protected 
by adequate safeguards of their right to obtain and retain suitable 
civilian employment.  The United States has a strong national interest 
in assuring that its military readiness will not be undermined by 
policies and practices which can deter competent and qualified citizens 
from military service. . . .  The ability of the United States to attract and 
retain the competent and qualified personnel necessary to meet our 
national security interests will be undermined absent a remedy [against 
state employers] . . . . 
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At present, a state military employee’s ability to bring a USERRA 
action against a state remains an open question, as the few decisions 
examining that issue are in disagreement.9  No court, however, has 
fully considered the impact of the Supreme Court’s most recent state 
sovereign immunity decisions on USERRA’s abrogation.  Thus, the 
question remains whether USERRA, which was enacted pursuant to 
Congress’s war powers, provides an exception to the Court’s generally 
dim view of Article I abrogation. 
This Article argues that, despite Supreme Court dicta suggesting 
that Congress can never abrogate state immunity under its Article I 
powers,10 the Court’s own holdings, and its most influential historical 
evidence, indicate that war powers abrogation is constitutional.  In 
short, the unique nature of the federal government’s war powers vis-
à-vis the states—as illustrated by the colonial period, the 
constitutional ratification debates, and the Constitution’s text—shows 
that the states did not believe that they possessed immunity where the 
federal government exercises its war powers.  Because the Court has 
recently held that these historical beliefs are determinative,11 
USERRA’s abrogation of state immunity under the federal war 
powers is valid. 
Part I of this Article describes the Supreme Court’s recent state 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  Part II then argues that, under 
that jurisprudence, USERRA’s war powers abrogation is 
constitutional.  Finally, Part III explores alternate means of enforcing 
USERRA should its abrogation be invalidated, and it recommends 
congressional action to ensure full state compliance with the Act. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S NEW FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 
The starting point for the Supreme Court’s recent state 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence is the Eleventh Amendment and 
the Court’s interpretation of it in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.12  
 
Id. at H1397-98 (statement of Rep. Evans). 
 9 See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text. 
 12 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (addressing abrogation of state immunity in the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 
(1994)).  For a more thorough analysis of Seminole Tribe and Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, and Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997). 
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Enacted to overrule the Court’s 1793 Chisholm v. Georgia decision,13 
the Eleventh Amendment declares that “[t]he Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”14 
As Seminole Tribe openly acknowledged, the Court has not felt 
bound by the literal text of the Amendment.15  Rather, the Court has 
continued to uphold an expansive interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment that began with Hans v. Louisiana,16 which held that the 
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over a suit brought against a state by 
one of its own citizens—even though the Amendment speaks only to 
suits by citizens of another state or country.  Despite its general 
willingness to broadly construe the Eleventh Amendment, the Court 
had curbed its reach where Congress permitted a private right of 
action against nonconsenting states.  In particular, the Court held in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.17 that Congress could validly abrogate 
state immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.18 
  Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the 
States at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because 
the congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete 
without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must 
be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority 
to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity 
where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to 
render them liable.19 
War powers abrogation provided little controversy under Union 
Gas, for Congress’s authority to abrogate state immunity pursuant to 
its commerce and war powers was equal.20  In Seminole Tribe, however, 
 
 13 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that federal jurisdiction existed over a suit 
by a South Carolina citizen seeking payment of a debt by the State of Georgia). 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 15 See 517 U.S. at 54. 
 16 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that a state can invoke sovereign immunity against 
a suit by one of its own citizens for breach of contract). 
 17 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”). 
 19 491 U.S. at 19-20. 
 20 See, e.g., Reopell v. Massachusetts, 936 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding, pre-
Seminole Tribe, that the Supreme Court’s “rationale for holding that the Commerce 
Clause enactments abrogate the Eleventh Amendment equally supports War Power 
abrogation”); Jennings v. Ill. Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(holding, pre-Seminole Tribe, that USERRA’s abrogation was valid because “Congress 
was exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the 
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the Court overruled Union Gas and held that Congress’s attempt to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act,21 which was enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause,22 
violated the Eleventh Amendment. 
Writing for the Court in Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
directly addressed the central issue underlying Congress’s power to 
abrogate: whether the Eleventh Amendment grants states 
constitutional immunity or merely common-law protection 
susceptible to congressional abrogation.  According to the Court, the 
immunity is constitutional and “the background principle of state 
sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so 
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is in an area . . . 
that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.”23 
Despite the significance of its holding that states’ sovereign 
immunity was constitutional in nature, Seminole Tribe did not preclude 
all congressional attempts to abrogate.  Rather, the Court explicitly 
reemphasized the validity of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,24 another decision 
authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, in which the Court held that 
Congress could abrogate state immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.25 
In upholding Fitzpatrick, the Court distinguished congressional 
attempts to abrogate under the Fourteenth Amendment versus the 
Commerce Clauses.  The Court first noted that, unlike the 
Commerce Clauses, Section 126 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
expressly prohibited certain state actions, and Section 527 gave 
Congress the power to enforce Section 1; thus, the Amendment 
 
Constitutional (war powers) grant”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 23 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72; accord Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports 
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).  For criticism of Seminole Tribe’s holding that state 
sovereign immunity is constitutionally required, see, for example, Seminole Tribe, 517 
U.S. at 82-83 (Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 
259-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the 
Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
495, 507-08 (1997). 
 24 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding abrogation under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964). 
 25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating, in part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
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expanded federal power at the “expense of state autonomy.”28  Then, 
the Court stressed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s expansion of 
congressional power vis-à-vis the states occurred after the Eleventh 
Amendment’s ratification: 
  Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to 
the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh 
Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to 
alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power 
achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.29 
Although this chronological distinction is less than satisfying,30 
Seminole Tribe made clear that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s 
abrogation violated the Eleventh Amendment because Congress 
acted under the earlier-ratified Indian Commerce Clause.31  The 
Court concluded that, under its chronological analysis, “[e]ven when 
the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority 
over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
congressional authorization [under Article I] of suits by private 
parties against unconsenting States.”32 
Finally, on a more practical note, the Court in Seminole Tribe 
established a two-step analysis for determining whether Congress 
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.  The first step is to assess 
whether Congress “‘unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate 
the immunity.’”33  Then, if the intent to abrogate is clear, the next 
step is to examine “whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power.’”34  In short, if Congress clearly granted a private 
right of action against nonconsenting states, did it have the power to 
do so? 
 
 28 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. 
 29 Id. at 65-66. 
 30 See Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a New Way to Enforce 
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 644 & n.62 (2000) (“It is difficult to see why the 
subsequent enactment of the Eleventh Amendment undercuts evidence from the 
ratification period.”); Meltzer, supra note 12, at 21-23. 
 31 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66. 
 32 Id. at 72. 
 33 Id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). 
 34 Id. (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 68); see also id. at 59 (“Was the Act in question 
passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to 
abrogate?”). 
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B. Weighing State Sovereign Immunity Against Congressional 
Abrogation 
Following Seminole Tribe, the Court has addressed congressional 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under several employment 
statutes,35 principally ones enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Although USERRA was enacted under Congress’s 
Article I war powers rather than the Fourteenth Amendment,36 the 
Court’s analyses in those cases display an explicit balancing of 
interests that are relevant to the validity of war powers abrogation.  In 
particular, USERRA’s importance to the nation’s military needs may 
provide a rare situation for the Court to tip the balance away from 
state sovereign immunity concerns and toward Congress’s goals in 
abrogating that immunity. 
It must first be noted that the curtailment of Congress’s 
abrogation power coincided with new restrictions on its ability to 
enact legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In City of Boerne 
v. Flores,37 the Court held that Congress’s power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment is only remedial and cannot alter the scope 
of constitutional rights; defining those rights is the role of courts 
alone.38  The key holding in Boerne was that the determination 
 
 35 See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (holding that 
individuals can sue state employers for monetary damages under Family and Medical 
Leave Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding 
that individuals cannot sue state employers for monetary damages under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 
(same, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706 (1999) (same, under the Fair Labor Standards Act).  Although the Supreme 
Court has yet to address abrogation in other employment statutes, there is a 
substantial body of law from other courts that has done so.  For example, most post-
Seminole Tribe courts have upheld abrogation under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(2)(C), 206(d) (2000).  See, e.g., Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 
927 (7th Cir. 2000); Hundertmark v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 
2000); O’Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. State Univ. 
of N.Y., 169 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded by 528 U.S. 1111 (2000) 
(citing Kimel), on remand, 107 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding abrogation to 
be valid); Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1998); Timmer v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 36 See infra note 102. 
 37 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court held that neutral, generally 
applicable laws do not have to show a compelling government interest to apply to 
religious practices.  Congress sought to reverse Smith’s interpretation of the First 
Amendment by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).  Boerne held that RFRA was 
unconstitutional.  Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. 
 38 521 U.S. at 519; see also Althouse, supra note 30, at 674; Christopher L. 
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whether Congress exceeded its remedial power turns on the 
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the 
legitimate end to be achieved.”39 
Boerne’s impact on state sovereign immunity abrogation was not 
necessarily apparent at the time, for the Court also emphasized that 
“[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can 
fall within the sweep of Congress’ [Fourteenth Amendment] 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which 
is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of 
autonomy previously reserved to the States.’”40  The Court, however, 
subsequently embarked on an explicit balancing of Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment power against the states’ sovereign immunity 
interests and, despite Boerne’s deferential language, the states’ 
immunity concerns have generally prevailed. 
In its examinations of various employment statutes, the Court 
has reemphasized the validity of Congress’s power to abrogate state 
immunity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196441 and 
cursorily rejected abrogation under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”).42  The Court’s more comprehensive employment decisions 
 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 86-87. 
 39 521 U.S. at 533; see Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 
Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 
109 (discussing, in part, the relationship between the Court’s Fourteenth 
Amendment limits and state sovereign immunity). 
 40 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).  
At least one commentator did note the potential negative impact on federal 
employment statutes.  See Joanne C. Brant, Seminole Tribe, Flores and State Employees: 
Reflections on a New Relationship, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 175 (1998) 
(predicting that Boerne would eliminate most federal employment protections for 
state employees). 
 41 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994); see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 65-66 
(reemphasizing the validity of Fitzpatrick, which upheld Congress’s power to abrogate 
state immunity under Title VII’s prohibition against intentional race discrimination); 
Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that 
Title VII’s abrogation of state immunity was not clear and reaffirming the relevancy 
of Fitzpatrick after Seminole Tribe).  Doubts could be raised, however, about whether 
Title VII’s abrogation is valid where it prohibits disparate impact discrimination.  See 
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 38, at 90-91 (arguing that Boerne permits Congress to 
authorize private disparate impact race discrimination claims against states). 
 42 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994); see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding 
that Congress could not allow individuals to pursue a FLSA claim for money damages 
against a nonconsenting state in state court).  Congress’s struggle to apply the FLSA 
to the states provides a good illustration of the difficulties caused by the Court’s 
changing sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  After the Court held in 1973 that the 
FLSA did not clearly state an intent to abrogate state immunity, see Employees v. Mo. 
Pub. Health Dep’t, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973), Congress amended the Act to make its 
intent to abrogate clear, see 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1974).  In 1976, however, the Court 
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initially involved statutes prohibiting discrimination based on age and 
disability.  In those two cases, the Court acknowledged Congress’s 
explicit attempt to provide national protection for employees—
including those who work for state employers—but concluded that 
Congress’s power to achieve its goals was overwhelmed by state 
sovereign immunity interests.  That emphasis on state immunity 
interests was finally curbed, however, by the Court’s subsequent 
decision upholding private rights of action against state employers to 
enforce federal family medical leave requirements. 
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,43 the Court held that 
Congress’s abrogation of state immunity under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)44 was unconstitutional.  
Kimel was notable for its explicit balancing of state immunity interests 
against individual rights, as the Court focused its criticism on 
Congress’s failure to show that state employers, rather than 
employers in general, were engaging in a pattern of unconstitutional 
age discrimination.45 
The central issue in Kimel was whether the ADEA’s abrogation 
was a “congruent and proportional” exercise of Congress’s 
 
held that Congress could not extend the FLSA to state employees in “areas of 
traditional governmental functions.”  Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 
852 (1976).  In 1985, the Court reversed course and held that the FLSA covered all 
state employees.  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985). 
 43 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 44 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).  Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, and it 
originally applied only to private employers.  See id. § 630(b) (1970) (excluding as an 
“employer” the “United States . . . or a State or political subdivision thereof”).  The 
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 amended the ADEA’s definition of 
“employer” to include “a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or 
instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State.”  Id. § 630(b) (1994); see 
also id. § 626(b) (incorporating id. § 216(b), which permits an individual to bring a 
civil action “against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State 
court of competent jurisdiction”); id. § 203(x) (defining “public agency” as “the 
government of a State or political subdivision thereof . . . [and] any agency of . . . a 
State, or political subdivision of a State”). 
 45 The Court never addressed why Congress would have provided such evidence, 
given that it had no reason to believe that such findings were necessary at the time.  
More importantly, the Court failed to acknowledge that its retroactive application of 
Seminole Tribe may ignore evidence of state discrimination that existed, but that 
Congress was never compelled to seek out or present.  See Vikram David Amar & 
Samuel Estreicher, Conduct Unbecoming a Coordinate Branch, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 351, 355 
(2001) (noting that congressional findings for the ADA may have found more state 
violations if Congress knew of their subsequent significance).  However, in 
reformulating USERRA’s application to state employers, Congress did note that after 
Seminole Tribe, several federal courts had held that USERRA’s abrogation was invalid.  
See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H1398, H1398 (Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Evans). 
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Fourteenth Amendment power.46  In spite of the obvious 
congressional intent to apply the statute to state employers, the Court 
held that “the substantive requirements that the ADEA imposes on 
state and local governments are disproportionate to any 
unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the 
Act.”47 
Underlying that conclusion was the Court’s holding that the type 
of class being protected directly affects the “congruence and 
proportionality” of a statute’s application to state employers.48  The 
ADEA suffered under that analysis, for age bias is entitled only to 
rational basis review, rather than the strict or heightened scrutiny of 
other classifications.49  Accordingly, because the ADEA prohibited 
age-based classifications that were likely rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest, its abrogation of state immunity was “so out 
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it 
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
 
 46 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. 
 47 Id.  But see id. at 93, 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is the Framers’ compromise 
giving each State equal representation in the Senate that provides the principal 
structural protection for the sovereignty of the several States. . . .  [O]nce Congress 
has made its policy choice, the sovereignty concerns of the several States are satisfied 
. . . .”). 
 48 See id. at 83; see also Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2000).  
But see id. at 535-41 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (arguing that Kimel and Boerne did not 
substantively change Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment where a suspect or quasi-suspect class is at issue—there need only be a 
rational basis for Congress’s action). 
 49 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance 
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 
(1976)).  Under rational basis review, a state may discriminate based on age without 
violating the Fourteenth Amendment if the classification is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest—that is, states may “draw lines on the basis of age when they 
have a rational basis for doing so at a class-based level, even if it is ‘probably not true’ 
that those reasons are valid in the majority of cases.”  Id.  The relevance of this 
reasoning is not immediately apparent, for the ADEA allows similar discrimination 
under its bona fide occupational quality defense.  See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).  
The Court, however, held that the bona fide occupational defense is different from 
rational basis review because the former requires a showing of “reasonable necessity” 
and shifts the burden to the state.  See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-87.  The Court also noted 
that rational basis review allows states to use age as a proxy for other policies, while 
the ADEA does not.  See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)).  Yet, it is puzzling why the 
Court weighed states’ immunity interests against general age-based policies, rather 
than individual claims of unconstitutional age discrimination.  Such an analysis 
suggests that Congress could find a pattern of age discrimination against individuals 
by states, but is powerless to address that pattern as long as the discrimination occurs 
under policies that have a rational basis as applied to the majority of, but not all, 
older workers. 
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unconstitutional behavior.”50 
The Court acknowledged that Congress’s enforcement power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to remedying 
constitutional violations,51 and therefore examined “whether the 
ADEA is in fact just an appropriate [prophylactic] remedy or, instead, 
merely an attempt to substantively redefine the States’ legal 
obligation with respect to age discrimination.”52  Noting the legislative 
history’s failure to cite evidence of a pattern of state age 
discrimination—even though Congress extended the ADEA to state 
employers in 1979, well before it had any reason to believe that such 
evidence was necessary—the Court held “that Congress had virtually 
no reason to believe that state and local governments were 
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis 
of age.”53  Given the lack of such a pattern, Congress’s abrogation of 
state immunity was not congruent and proportional to the ADEA’s 
“broad prophylactic legislation,” and therefore violated the Eleventh 
Amendment.54 
Kimel aptly demonstrated that in a balance between deference to 
Congress and state sovereign immunity, the latter is paramount.  The 
prominence of state immunity vis-à-vis congressional prerogatives was 
 
 50 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). 
 51 Id. at 88 (“Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies, 
and we have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably 
prophylactic legislation.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 91.  Although it noted Congress’s ability to provide a broad remedy 
against possible constitutional violations, the Court repeatedly invoked the dearth of 
evidence indicating a pattern of constitutional violations.  See, e.g., id. (“Congress’ 
failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination . . . 
confirms that [it] had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was 
necessary.”).  That requirement ignores both Congress’s ability to address injuries 
that do not violate the  constitution and the very meaning of “prophylactic.”  It 
appears difficult to prove that prophylactic legislation is necessary if the only means 
to do so is through evidence that the targeted problem was already widespread.  But 
see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1983 (2003) (holding that 
prophylactic abrogation in the FMLA was valid because earlier attempts to remedy 
gender-based discrimination had failed).  Moreover, by requiring proof of a pattern 
of constitutional violations by the states, particularly after a statute’s enactment, the 
Court drastically increased its willingness to challenge Congress’s factfinding and 
legislative prerogatives.  See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 
380 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In reviewing § 5 legislation, we have never 
required the sort of extensive investigation of each piece of evidence that the Court 
appears to contemplate.”).  Indeed, whether courts are suited to identify and remedy 
discrimination that occurs throughout various parts of the country is debatable.  See 
id. at 380-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts are ill-suited to make such 
findings). 
 54 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. 
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further illustrated in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett,55 where the Court struck down Congress’s abrogation of state 
immunity in the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).56 
As in Kimel, the rational basis review used for disability 
discrimination grounded the Court’s holding.57  Although the Court 
acknowledged that prohibiting employment discrimination against 
the disabled was generally a valid purpose under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it held that Congress again failed to show that 
individuals needed protection against a pattern of unconstitutional 
discrimination by states.58  Thus, according to the Court, permitting 
individuals to sue states under the ADA was not congruent and 
proportional to the injuries being targeted and, therefore, was 
invalid.59 
 
 55 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 56 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).  Congress’s intent to abrogate state 
immunity was undeniable; the ADA mandates that “[a] State shall not be immune 
under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an 
action in Federal or State court . . . .”  Id. § 12202; see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.  
Moreover, the ADA provides a clear statement of Congress’s belief that it was enacted 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, for the Act declares that its purpose is “to 
invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the 
fourteenth amendment, . . . [and] to address the major areas of discrimination faced 
day-to-day by people with disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4); see Garrett, 531 U.S. 
at 364 n.3. 
 57 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 446 (1985)).  Garrett defined rational basis review as requiring a plaintiff to 
show that there exists no “‘reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
rational basis for the classification.’”  Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 
(1993)); see also id. at 387-88 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult to understand 
why the Court, which applies minimum rational-basis review to statutes that burden 
people with disabilities, subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help 
those same individuals.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Amar & 
Estreicher, supra note 45, at 354-56 (criticizing Garrett for looking only to state, rather 
than municipal and county, discrimination in employment). 
 58 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.  It is striking that, in finding no pattern of 
discrimination, the Court dismissed a wealth of congressional findings on disability 
discrimination because, with few exceptions, they did not involve states engaging in 
such discrimination.  See id. at 366-67.  But see id. at 378-79 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“The powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment throughout society in general, 
including discrimination by private persons and local governments, implicates state 
governments as well, for state agencies form part of that larger society. . . .  
[Moreover, t]here are roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments 
themselves in the legislative record.”). 
 59 See id. at 374 (“Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy, but 
in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the 
States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent 
and proportional to the targeted violation.  Those requirements are not met here . . . 
.”); id. at 367-68 (“States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make 
special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such 
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In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,60 the Court 
confirmed the emphasis that Kimel and Garrett appeared to place on 
the identity of a protected class.  In Hibbs, the Court held that 
Congress validly abrogated state immunity in the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”).61  As the Court recognized, the FMLA “aims to 
protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the 
workplace.”62  Yet, unlike age and disability,63 gender-based 
classifications are reviewed under a heightened scrutiny standard.64  
That difference was vital to the Court’s holding. 
As it had done in Kimel and Garrett, the Court reviewed the 
evidence of state discrimination that Congress relied on to abrogate 
state immunity—this time evidence of discriminatory family medical 
leave policies.  Although the FMLA evidence was not substantially 
different than that of the ADEA and ADA,65 the Court found that 
“States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, 
gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is 
weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 
legislation.”66  The Court made clear why it held that abrogation 
 
individuals are rational.  They could quite hard headedly—and perhaps 
hardheartedly—hold to job qualification requirements which do not make allowance 
for the disabled.”).  The Court also emphasized that the ADA’s protections extended 
beyond the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring “reasonable 
accommodation” of disabled workers and by proscribing actions that “disparately 
impact” those workers.  Id. at 372-73. 
 60 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). 
 61 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).  Congress clearly intended for the FMLA to 
abrogate state immunity, as it permits private rights of action for money damages 
“against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of 
competent jurisdiction.”  Id. § 2617(a)(2).  Although Hibbs, at a minimum, validated 
the FMLA’s abrogation with regard to family leave requirements, some courts have 
held that it left open the question whether the FMLA’s abrogation for personal leave 
was valid.  See, e.g., Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1164 
(10th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing Hibbs, and holding that the FMLA’s abrogation of 
state immunity for personal leave was unconstitutional). 
 62 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978. 
 63 See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text. 
 64 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976)).  
The Court defined heightened scrutiny as requiring a classification to “‘serve 
important governmental objectives,’ and ‘the discriminatory means employed [must 
be] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
 65 See Vikram David Amar, The New “New Federalism,” 6 GREEN BAG 2D 349, 351-53 
(2003) (noting similarities of evidence relied upon to pass the ADA and FMLA). 
 66 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981.  The Court relied on studies showing that private 
employers provide more maternity than paternity leave, that leave policies in the 
public and private sectors are similar, and that few of the states providing extended 
maternity leave gave similar paternity leave; it also relied on testimony that public 
and private sector leave policies are discriminatory and that most states provided no 
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under the FMLA was valid but concluded that abrogation under the 
ADEA and ADA was not: “Because the standard for demonstrating 
the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult 
to meet than our rational-basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to 
show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”67  Congress’s 
attempt to remedy this pattern in the FMLA, therefore, was 
congruent and proportional to the problem it targeted.68 
Garrett, Kimel, and Hibbs illustrate the Court’s insistence on a 
statute-specific justification for Congress’s abrogation of state 
immunity.69  That case-by-case review takes on particular significance 
with regard to USERRA’s abrogation.  Because the federal 
government’s war powers will no doubt garner more respect from the 
Court than the ADEA and ADA—particularly when the nation is 
engaged in war—USERRA may provide a rare instance where the 
Court finds the need to abrogate more compelling than state 
immunity. 
II. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY V. USERRA’S WAR POWERS 
ABROGATION 
A. USERRA Background 
The United States has sought to protect the employment rights 
of noncareer military personnel since World War II.70  In its latest 
 
family medical leave.  See id. at 1979-80.  But see id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that to allow enforcement against a state, there must be a finding that the 
particular state had a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination); id. at 1987-91 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the evidence relied upon by the majority as not 
showing a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states). 
 67 Id. at 1982.  The Court further noted that “[u]nlike the statutes in City of 
Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, which applied broadly to every aspect of state employers’ 
operations, the FMLA is narrowly targeted at the fault line between work and 
family—precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains 
strongest—and affects only one aspect of the employment relationship.”  Id. at 1983. 
 68 See id. at 1982. 
 69 See Susan Bandes, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and the “Plan of the Convention,” 42 
VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 745 (2002) (arguing that in “determining the scope of the 
abrogation power, it is essential to identify the authority under which Congress acted 
in order to know whether its attempt to subject the states to damage remedies is 
constitutional”).  But see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713, 726 n.69 (2002) [hereinafter Vazquez, Treaties] (disagreeing 
with Bandes, and arguing that Congress’s power to abrogate does not depend on the 
authority under which it acted). 
 70 See Lt. Col. H. Craig Manson, The Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 47 A.F. L. REV. 55, 56-57 (1999) (noting that original 
act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 308 (1946), repealed by Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 624, 62 
Stat. 625 (1948), was intended to prepare for the possibility of war and to enable 
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form, USERRA, formerly known as the Veterans’ Reemployment 
Rights Act (“VRRA”),71 is intended “to encourage noncareer service 
in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the 
disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can result 
from such service.”72  The goal of  “minimiz[ing] the disruption to the 
lives of persons performing service in the uniformed services . . . [is 
furthered] by providing for the prompt reemployment of such 
persons upon their completion of such service,”73 and by 
“prohibit[ing] discrimination against persons because of their 
service.”74 
USERRA provides reemployment rights to “any person whose 
absence from a position of employment is necessitated by reason of 
service in the uniformed services.”75  After such service, a military 
employee is entitled to be “promptly reemployed in the position of 
employment in which the person would have been employed” absent 
the interruption, or in the position the person left if not qualified for 
the “elevated” position.76  Moreover, for up to one year after 
reemployment,77 the military employee can be terminated only for 
“just cause.”78  The military employee is also entitled to the same 
employment benefits as an employee on nonmilitary furlough or 
 
service members to return to civilian jobs, and that subsequent amendments were 
enacted to support the Cold War and the Vietnam conflict). 
 71 USERRA replaced VRRA, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2027, on October 13, 1994.  
USERRA was enacted to “clarify, simplify, and where necessary, strengthen the 
existing veterans’ employment and re-employment rights provisions” of the former 
VRRA.  H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, at 19 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2451. 
 72 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (2000); see also Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 
549, 559-60 (1981); Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 613 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 73 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a)(2). 
 74 Id. § 4301(a)(3); Eve I. Klein & Maria Cilenti, When Duty Calls: What Obligations 
Do Employers Have to Employees Who Are Called to Military Service?, 73 N.Y. ST. B. J. 10, 10 
(2001); Manson, supra note 70, at 58 (noting need for reserve forces following 
decrease in active duty service following end of Cold War). 
 75 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a).  “Service in the uniformed services” covers “performance 
of duty on a voluntary or involuntary basis in a uniformed service under competent 
authority.”  Id. § 4303(13) (including “active duty,” “active duty for training,” “initial 
active duty for training,” “inactive duty training,” and “full-time National Guard 
duty”).  “Uniformed Service” includes service in the United States Armed Forces, 
Army National Guard, Air National Guard, commissioned corps of the Public Health 
Service, and any positions designated by the President during war or emergency.  See 
id. § 4303(16). 
 76 Id. § 4313(a)(1)(A). 
 77 The period of protection is one year if the military service was for over 180 
days; the period is 180 days if the service was between 30 and 180 days.  See id. § 
4316(c). 
 78 See id. § 4316(c). 
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leave,79 including health insurance coverage for up to eighteen 
months.80  Exceptions exist where an employer proves that 
reemployment would be unreasonable or cause undue hardship to 
the employer, the position was temporary, or there was legally 
sufficient cause to terminate the employee before the military leave.81 
USERRA also forbids discrimination by prohibiting an employer 
from denying “initial employment, reemployment, retention in 
employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment”82 if a 
person’s “membership, application for membership, service, 
application for service, or obligation for service in the uniformed 
services is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the 
employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the 
absence of such . . . service.”83  To prove discrimination under 
USERRA, a plaintiff must show that military service was a “substantial 
or motivating factor” in an adverse action.84 
It is well established that courts will liberally construe USERRA 
in favor of the military employee.85  Where a violation is found, the 
Act’s remedies include equitable relief, make-whole compensation, 
liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.86  In short, USERRA 
provides substantial employment rights for those employees that have 
served, or will have to serve, in the United States military.  The extent 
to which state military employees enjoy those rights is uncertain, 
however.  Although Congress has made clear its intent that USERRA 
applies to state employers,87 the Supreme Court’s state sovereign 
 
 79 See id. §§ 4311, 4316(b)(1); Klein & Cilenti, supra note 74, at 11.  Those 
benefits include contributions to pension plans and calculation of service for such 
plans as if the military employee was not on military leave.  See 38 U.S.C. § 4318. 
 80 See 38 U.S.C. § 4317(a)(1)(A).  However, after 31 days of leave, the employee 
may be required to pay up to 102% of the premiums.  See id. § 4317(a)(2). 
 81 See id. § 4312 (setting forth procedures that the military employee must follow 
to qualify for reemployment rights); Klein & Cilenti, supra note 74, at 11. 
 82 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). 
 83 The employer is also prohibited from taking adverse action in retaliation 
against individuals’ attempts to enforce their rights under USERRA.  See id. § 
4311(c)(1). 
 84 See Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1996); Klein & 
Cilenti, supra note 74, at 14, 20 (noting that the “motivating factor” standard is 
generally interpreted as mirroring the burden-shifting standard used in National 
Labor Relations Board cases, such as NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 394-
95 (approving NLRB’s standard as expressed in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 
(1980))). 
 85 See Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584 (1977); McGuire v. United Parcel 
Serv., 152 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 86 See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d), (e), (h). 
 87 See id. § 4303(4)(A)(iii) (defining “employer” to include a state); § 4323(b) 
(permitting actions against state employers); § 4323(c)(2)(B)(7) (“Any person 
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immunity jurisprudence threatens to significantly undermine state 
military employees’ ability to exercise their rights under the Act. 
B. War Powers Abrogation After Seminole Tribe 
As discussed,88 the Court has taken an increasingly skeptical view 
of congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity.  In 
striking down such efforts, the Court has balanced what it views as the 
extraordinary importance of state sovereign immunity against the 
lesser need to abrogate that immunity in a particular statute.89  
Abrogation under USERRA, however, presents a unique situation. 
As argued below, Congress’s abrogation of state immunity 
pursuant to its war powers is constitutionally valid, despite the Court’s 
general disapproval of Article I abrogation.  That conclusion follows 
from the Court’s recent emphasis on states’ expectations when they 
ratified the Constitution.  The Founders’ intent that the nation 
exercise its war powers with a single voice, which was advanced by 
granting exclusive war powers to the federal government and 
expressly limiting states’ powers, indicates that the plan of the 
Constitution was not to allow states to thwart congressional war 
powers enactments through claims of sovereign immunity. 
As noted, Seminole Tribe created a two-part test for analyzing the 
validity of a statute’s abrogation.90  USERRA clearly satisfies the first 
requirement—whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate state immunity91—for the Act explicitly permits private suits 
against states.92  The second requirement—whether that abrogation is 
 
[employed by a State or political subdivision] shall not be denied . . . retention in 
employment, or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment 
because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed 
Forces.”). 
 88 See supra notes 12-68 and accompanying text. 
 89 See supra note 69. 
 90 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
 91 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 92 See supra note 87; see also Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 981 F. Supp. 
529, 531 (W.D. Mich. 1997).  But cf. Forster v. SAIF Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 
(D. Or. 1998) (assuming, because of plaintiff’s concession, that Congress did not 
abrogate state immunity under USERRA).  Moreover, consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent refusing to extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to municipalities and 
counties, USERRA also permits federal suits against political subdivisions of a state.  
See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(1) (2000) (granting federal jurisdiction over suits against a 
“private employer,” which “includes a political division of a State”); Miller v. City of 
Indianapolis, No. IP-99-1735-CMS, 2001 WL 406346, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 13, 2001), 
aff’d, 281 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2002).  Finally, as discussed infra notes 221-44 and 
accompanying text, it is unclear whether USERRA currently abrogates state 
immunity in federal court.  The following discussion, however, still applies to 
USERRA’s clear abrogation of state immunity in state courts, and to war powers 
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valid—is in much greater dispute.  Indeed, that question has created 
a split between the two federal circuit courts that have addressed 
USERRA’s application to state employers.93 
Much responsibility for those conflicting views may be placed on 
Supreme Court dicta suggesting that Congress cannot abrogate state 
immunity pursuant to any of its Article I powers.  A typical example 
states that Congress cannot “under Article I expand the scope of 
federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III.”94  The Court, however, 
has never addressed whether war powers abrogation is an exception 
 
abrogation generally. 
 93 See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text. 
 94 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996); see also Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 761 (2002) (holding that states are 
immune from federal administrative adjudication of a complaint filed against the 
state by a private party because “it would be quite strange to prohibit Congress from 
exercising its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Article III 
judicial proceedings, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72, but permit the use of those 
same Article I powers to create court-like administrative tribunals where sovereign 
immunity does not apply”); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 
364 (2001) (“Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I.”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78 (2000) (“In Seminole Tribe, we held that Congress lacks the 
power under Article I to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.”); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706, 754 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999).  Most lower courts subsequently addressing Article I 
abrogation have relied on such dicta as a basis for finding war powers abrogation 
invalid.  See Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Florida Prepaid in rejecting argument that Congress’s war powers justified the Indian 
Non-Intercourse Act’s abrogation of state immunity); Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of 
State Police, 981 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (“Applying the lessons of 
Seminole Tribe, it necessarily follows that Congress, acting under Article I, could not 
effectively abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in USERRA.”); 
Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 362-63 (Ala. 
2001) (holding that “Alden forecloses, on constitutional grounds, resort to Article I as 
the basis for subjecting the State of Alabama to suit [under USERRA] in a state court 
on a remedy based on Congress’s assertion of its powers with respect to military 
preparedness”).  As explained below, however, those cases are undermined by the 
Court’s subsequent holding in Alden, despite Alden’s restatement of that dictum.  See 
Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 761-62 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 
124 S. Ct. 45 (2003) (rejecting dicta in holding that Bankruptcy Act abrogation was 
valid, although noting that five other circuits disagreed: Nelson v. La Crosse County 
Dist. Attorney, 301 F.3d 820, 832-34 (7th Cir. 2002); Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 
209 F.3d 1111, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2000); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania, 133 F.3d 
237, 242-43 (3d Cir. 1998); Fernandez v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co., 123 F.3d 241, 243-45 
(5th Cir.), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1138-39 (5th Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v. 
Maryland, 119 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (4th Cir. 1997)).  Indeed, the Court’s most recent 
restatement of this rule referred only to Congress’s Article I commerce power.  See Nev. 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003) (“Congress may not 
abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I power over 
commerce.”). 
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to its general prohibition against Article I abrogation.95 
The First Circuit, in Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson,96 expressly 
refused to apply that dictum to USERRA and concluded that its 
abrogation of state immunity was valid.97  The court held that Seminole 
Tribe did not overrule an earlier First Circuit case that upheld war 
powers abrogation, Reopell v. Massachusetts,98 because Seminole Tribe 
addressed only Congress’s Interstate Commerce Clause power and 
“does not control the War Powers analysis.”99  The court’s reliance on 
Reopell is not entirely persuasive, for the basis of that decision was that 
the Supreme Court’s “rationale for holding that the Commerce 
Clause enactments abrogate the Eleventh Amendment equally 
supports War Power abrogation.”100  Seminole Tribe, of course, later 
held that Congress could not abrogate pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause, thereby undermining Reopell’s equation of Congress’s 
commerce and war powers.  Yet, as explained in the next section, the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Alden supports the First 
Circuit’s reluctance to hold that Seminole Tribe effectively foreclosed 
war powers abrogation. 
In Velasquez v. Frapwell,101 Chief Judge Posner, writing for the 
Seventh Circuit, more thoroughly examined USERRA’s abrogation 
under Seminole Tribe and concluded that it was unconstitutional.  The 
central holding in Velasquez was that Congress’s war powers, like its 
powers under the Commerce Clause and the rest of Article I, 
predates the Eleventh Amendment’s reestablishment of states’ 
immunity against private suits.102  Thus, only power granted to 
Congress after the Eleventh Amendment’s ratification may be 
 
 95 See also Bandes, supra note 69, at 746 (arguing that this dictum should not be 
taken literally because, in part, sovereign immunity may be overridden through 
conditional waivers of state immunity obtained under Congress’s Spending Clause 
power) (citing William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 843, 853 (2000)). 
 96 90 F.3d 609 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 97 Id. at 616 & n.9. 
 98 936 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a state is liable for prejudgment 
interest under the VRRA). 
 99 Diaz-Gandia, 90 F.3d at 616 n.9 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 
1 (1989)). 
 100 Reopell, 936 F.2d at 16 (citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1). 
 101 160 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 102 See 160 F.3d at 392; accord Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 981 F. Supp. 
529, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1997).  The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
USERRA’s abrogation was based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—
concluding that the “only constitutional basis of USERRA is . . . the war power”—and 
refused to consider whether due process abrogation was applicable.  Velasquez, 160 
F.3d at 391-92. 
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sufficient to abrogate state immunity.103 
Although that chronological distinction is not particularly 
convincing,104 it has support under Seminole Tribe, where the Court 
distinguished its approval of Fourteenth Amendment abrogation, 
stating that “the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the 
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the 
Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state 
and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh 
Amendment.”105  The Velasquez court’s reliance on that statement was 
soon undermined, however, for the Court shortly thereafter 
abandoned its emphasis on chronology. 
C. Alden v. Maine: A Historical Basis for State Immunity 
Prior to Seminole Tribe, few courts were concerned with an 
employee’s ability to pursue a federal lawsuit against a state employer 
in state court because such an option had generally been considered 
available.106  In Alden v. Maine,107 the Supreme Court eliminated that 
option. 
The plaintiffs in Alden had filed a FLSA suit in federal court 
against their employer, the State of Maine.108  After the Supreme 
Court subsequently decided Seminole Tribe, the district court dismissed 
the Alden suit.109  The plaintiffs then filed their claims in state court, 
which were dismissed based on the state’s argument that it had 
immunity against private suits in its own courts.110 
In rejecting the validity of Congress’s clear abrogation of state 
immunity in the FLSA, the Court, in an opinion better left for others 
to criticize,111 held that “the powers delegated to Congress under 
 
 103 See id. at 391. 
 104 See supra note 30. 
 105 517 U.S. at 65-66. 
 106 See, e.g., Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394; Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 
(6th Cir. 1996). 
 107 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 108 See id. at 711-12. 
 109 See id. at 712. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See, e.g., id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting); Joan Meyler, A Matter of 
Misinterpretation, State Sovereign Immunity, and Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence: The 
Supreme Court’s Reformation of the Constitution in Seminole Tribe and Its Progeny, 45 
HOW. L.J. 77, 141-48 (2001) (arguing that the Founders’ intent under the 
Constitution was to permit Congress to authorize federal court jurisdiction over most 
private suits against states); see also John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State 
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895-1914 (1983) 
(arguing that the historical evidence shows that the states never thought they 
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Article I . . . do not include the power to subject nonconsenting 
States to private suits for damages in state courts.”112  The Court 
emphasized that state sovereign immunity is not derived from the 
Eleventh Amendment; rather, it “is a fundamental aspect of the 
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution, and which they retain today . . . except as altered by the 
plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.”113  
The Eleventh Amendment merely confirmed that immunity.114 
Accordingly, states will possess immunity in a given area unless 
there is “‘compelling evidence’ that the states were required to 
surrender [their immunity] to Congress pursuant to the 
constitutional design.”115  The Alden Court concluded that neither the 
Supremacy Clause,116 nor Congress’s “specific Article I powers,” 
provided compelling evidence that the constitutional design 
permitted Congress to require a state to entertain a case against it in 
its own courts.117  The Court found that such evidence was also 
lacking in the “history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the 
Constitution,”118 and concluded that “the States retain immunity from 
private suits in their own courts, an immunity beyond the 
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.”119 
Although the Court’s sweeping statement that Congress cannot 
abrogate under Article I is an obstacle to war powers abrogation, 
 
possessed sovereignty against private suits during either the colonial period or the 
constitutional ratification); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create 
Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1425-30 (1975) (concluding that the 
Constitution intended for Congress to have the power to provide federal court 
jurisdiction in most suits against a state by citizens of another state). 
 112 Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
 113 Id. at 713. 
 114 See id. at 713, 728-29. 
 115 Id. at 731 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 
775, 781 (1991)); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68 (“There is also the postulate 
that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune 
from suits, without their consent, save where there has been a surrender of this 
immunity in the plan of the convention.”) (quoting Principality of Monaco v. 
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323 (1934) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 116 “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 117 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 731-34. 
 118 Id. at 741, 754; see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 
743, 753-54 (2002) (looking to original understanding of Constitution and early 
congressional practice). 
 119 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 741, 754. 
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Alden actually justifies the validity of USERRA’s application to state 
employers.  By shifting the analysis away from Seminole Tribe’s reliance 
on chronology and toward states’ historical immunity, Alden implicitly 
recognized that the history of the federal government’s war powers 
may constitute an exception to the general prohibition against Article 
I abrogation.120  In short, even if the plan of the Constitutional 
Convention did not intend for Congress to abrogate state immunity 
under all of its Article I powers, it is inconceivable that the 
Constitution—given its primary goal of establishing a central power 
over the new nation’s external relations, particularly its military 
abilities121—was intended to permit states to thwart the new federal 
war powers by invoking sovereign immunity. 
D. War Powers Abrogation After Alden 
Alden’s move away from a chronological analysis, and toward an 
emphasis on the history of the Constitution, provides an important 
basis for holding that USERRA’s war powers abrogation is valid.  To 
be sure, it is far from clear whether the current Court would hold 
that USERRA is an exception to its dicta prohibiting all Article I 
abrogation.  Yet, the extraordinary difference between Congress’s war 
powers122 and most of its other Article I powers suggests that, under 
the plan of the Constitution, the states did not retain immunity—if 
they ever had it—where the federal government acts to further the 
nation’s military efforts. 
The Court has relied on often confusing evidence from English 
common law, the Constitutional Convention, and the state ratifying 
conventions to hold that Congress lacks the general power under 
 
 120 See Althouse, supra note 30, at 644 n.62 (raising the possibility that Alden 
changes the basis for Velasquez); Major Hehr & Major Wallace, The Supreme Court 
“Outfoxes” the Ninth Circuit, 1999 ARMY LAW. 47, 53 n.97 (1999) (suggesting that 
Congress’s war power abrogation in USERRA may provide an exception to Seminole 
Tribe); cf. Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 762-67 (6th Cir.), 
cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 45 (2003) (holding that abrogation under the Bankruptcy Act 
was valid because the grant of power to Congress to make “uniform” laws in 
bankruptcy represented a design in the plan of the Constitution to allow abrogation 
where Congress exercises that power); Bandes, supra note 69, at 747-48 (arguing that 
abrogation under Congress’s treaty power may be valid after Alden).  But see Vazquez, 
Treaties, supra note 69, at 726 (suggesting that war powers abrogation is invalid). 
 121 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 122 As noted below, the federal government’s foreign powers in general may 
constitute an exception.  See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.  Those 
foreign powers may be part of what the Court referred to in Alden, where it held that 
the limits on federal supervision of the states do not apply “‘to matters [that] the 
Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States.’”  Alden, 527 
U.S. at 754 (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)). 
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Article I to abrogate state immunity.123  Rather than reexamine that 
history, this Article accepts the Court’s historical interpretation and 
argues that its own holdings, including its principal historical 
reference, support the validity of war powers abrogation. 
As oft-quoted by the Court, Alexander Hamilton stated in The 
Federalist No. 81 that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not 
to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. . . .  
Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of 
the convention, it will remain with the [s]tates . . . .”124  The very next 
sentence, although consistently absent from the Court’s majority 
opinions, declares that “[t]he circumstances which are necessary to 
produce an alienation of state sovereignty, were discussed in 
considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here.”125  
That discussion is found in The Federalist No. 32, where Hamilton 
stated: 
[A]s the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or 
consolidation, the state governments would clearly retain all the 
rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, 
by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.  This 
exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation of state sovereignty, 
would only exist in three cases: where the constitution in express 
terms granted an exclusive authority to the union; where it 
granted, in one instance, an authority to the union, and in 
another, prohibited the states from exercising the like authority; 
and where it granted an authority to the union, to which a similar 
authority in the states would be absolutely and totally contradictory 
and repugnant.126 
 
 123 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 714-57; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68-71. 
 124 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961), quoted in Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 752 
(2002); Alden, 527 U.S. at 716-17; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, 70 n.13; Hans 
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 773 & n.13 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Hamilton was stating the unique view that state immunity 
derived from natural, rather than common, law, and that he was referring only to 
immunity “with respect to diversity cases applying state contract law”).  Justice 
Souter’s dissent in Alden also noted the state ratification conventions’ disparate views 
on state immunity to argue that the majority’s historical analysis is not as certain as it 
claims.  See Alden, 527 U.S. at 775-81, 792 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 125 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 145-46 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting 
“difficulties that accrue to the majority from reliance on The Federalist No. 81”). 
 126 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see also Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 766 (6th Cir.), 
cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 45 (2003) (holding that bankruptcy abrogation falls under 
Hamilton’s “alienation” examples). 
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The federal government’s war powers satisfy all three of 
Hamilton’s “alienations.”  First, the federal government’s war powers 
are exclusive under two views: that the states never possessed such 
powers; or that the states allocated, through the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution, whatever colonial-era war 
powers they may have possessed to the federal government.127  
Indeed, Hamilton’s own belief was that the federal government’s war 
powers “ought to exist without limitation.”128  Second, the text of the 
Constitution explicitly grants war powers authority to the federal 
government, while prohibiting state power in the same area.129  Third, 
it is difficult to imagine any federal authority to which a similar 
 
 127 See infra notes 131-56 and accompanying text; see also ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION art. 6 (“No state shall engage in any war” without federal consent 
except for an invasion or emergency Indian attack.); id. art. 9 (“Congress possesses 
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war.”); Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1714 
(1997) (stating that in “traditional foreign relations contexts, federal exclusivity is 
effectively assured by Article I, Section 10 and by extant federal enactments”); Peter 
J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1228-29 (1999) 
(“[A]gainst the landscape of foreign relations as they were conducted at the time of 
the Founding, the allocation [of foreign power in the Constitution] seems decisively 
to have established a principle of federal exclusivity.”); John C. Yoo, The Continuation 
of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 
182 (1996) (noting, in discussion of separation of federal war powers, then-
Congressman and eventually Chief Justice Marshall’s statement that the President 
was “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations”) (quoting 10 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 613 (1800)); id. at 236-37 (“The drafters of the Articles vested all war powers 
in the Continental Congress.”).  See generally Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 16-18 
(1973) (describing theory that states vested foreign affairs authority to the federal 
government in the Constitutional Convention).  But see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of 
Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 280 (2002) (“[T]he Rehnquist 
Court’s increasingly restrictive approach to national authority in the domestic sphere 
raises interesting questions regarding the extent to which the Court will continue to 
authorize expansive national authority over foreign relations.”). 
 128 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see also Yoo, supra note 127, at 272 (quoting antifederalists’ concession during 
ratification debate that the federal government had exclusive power of “all foreign 
concerns, causes arising on the seas, to commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian 
affairs, peace and war,” and James Madison’s statement in THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 
292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961): “The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which 
are to remain in the State governments are numerous and infinite.  The former will 
be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign 
commerce . . . .”). 
 129 See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text; see also Goldsmith, supra note 
127, at 1619-20 (emphasizing that the foreign power provisions of the Constitution 
“give the federal political branches comprehensive power to conduct foreign 
relations without interference of limitation by the states”). 
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authority granted to individual states would be more “contradictory 
and repugnant.”  Thus, as the Seventh Circuit held in a pre-Seminole 
Tribe case, Congress’s abrogation of state immunity in USERRA was 
“an exercise of power delegated to it ‘in the plan of the convention,’ 
which includes the power to make the states amenable to damage 
actions in federal courts.”130 
The argument that the Constitution expressly granted the 
federal government exclusive authority over war powers is bolstered 
by well-established Supreme Court precedent holding that the states, 
even prior to the Articles of Confederation or Constitution, never 
possessed such powers.  In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,131 
for example, the Court explicitly held that the states never possessed 
authority to engage in foreign relations, including acts of war. 
Curtiss-Wright involved convictions under a presidential 
proclamation and congressional joint resolution prohibiting arms 
sales to Bolivia.132  One of the defendants’ arguments was that the 
joint resolution invalidly delegated congressional powers to the 
President by allowing him to decide whether to make arms sales 
illegal.133 
The Court rejected that defense.  Assuming that the resolution 
would normally constitute an invalid delegation of lawmaking 
authority, the Court asked whether an exception was warranted 
because the resolution involved a unique class of government 
conduct—one that is “entirely external to the United States, and 
falling within the category of foreign affairs.”134  In addressing that 
question, the Court made clear that the federal government’s foreign 
powers135 were fundamentally different from its domestic powers vis-à-
vis the states: 
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no 
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, 
and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into 
effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect 
of our internal affairs.  In that field, the primary purpose of the 
Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative 
powers then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought 
 
 130 Jennings v. Ill. Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 942 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 131 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 132 Id. at 311. 
 133 Id. at 314. 
 134 Id. at 315. 
 135 Id. at 318 (noting foreign powers, including the “powers to declare and wage 
war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, [and] to maintain diplomatic relations with 
other sovereignties”). 
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desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving those not 
included in the enumeration still in the states.  That this doctrine 
applies only to powers which the states had is self evident.  And 
since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers 
could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously 
were transmitted to the United States from some other source.136 
The Court’s conclusion that states never possessed war powers is 
significant.  Although states may have generally retained their 
sovereign immunity under the Constitution—even against express 
federal abrogation—it is implausible that they expected to have 
immunity where the federal government exercises powers that the 
states never possessed.137 
 
 136 Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added and internal citation omitted); see also Edward T. 
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE 
L.J. 1127, 1203 n.275 (2000) (citing articles, and noting Rufus King’s statement at 
the Constitutional Convention that “[t]he states were not ‘sovereigns’ in the sense 
contended for by some.  They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty.  
They could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties”) (quoting 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 323 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
(Madison’s notes)).  The basis for Curtiss-Wright’s holding was that the federal 
foreign affairs powers were “extra-constitutional” because the source of those powers 
was Great Britain, whose sovereignty passed to the Union as a whole, not to the 
individual states.  See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316, 318 (noting that, even if not 
mentioned in the Constitution, the foreign powers “would have vested in the federal 
government as necessary concomitants of nationality”). 
 137 The Court has emphasized federal exclusivity in other foreign powers cases, 
particularly in holding that conflicting state actions were preempted by the federal 
government’s exclusive power in that area.  See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 123 S. 
Ct. 2374, 2378 (2003) (holding that state requirement that insurance companies 
disclose information about Holocaust-era policies was preempted by a federal 
executive order because the state law “compromises the President’s very capacity to 
speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments”); Crosby v. 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2002) (invalidating state 
restrictions on trade with Burma because the “state Act presents a sufficient obstacle 
to the full accomplishment of Congress’s objectives under the [related] federal Act 
to find it preempted”); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (invalidating 
state law limiting nonresident alien claims to estate property because it “is an 
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts 
to the President and the Congress”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) 
(holding that state law must yield to decree negotiated by federal government and 
foreign country because “[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it 
is vested in the national government exclusively”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
63 (1941) (holding that state alien registration act was invalid because “[n]o state 
can add to or take from the force and effect of [a] treaty . . . for [t]he Federal 
Government . . . is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of 
affairs with foreign sovereignties”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 
(1937) (“[The] complete power over international affairs is in the national 
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on 
the part of the several states.  In respect of all international negotiations and 
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.  As 
to such purposes the [s]tate . . . does not exist.”) (internal citation omitted); Missouri 
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To be sure, as the Velasquez court noted, there is legitimate doubt 
about the Court’s holding that states never possessed war powers.138  
Even if the Court overruled Curtiss-Wright, however, and found that 
the colonial state governments had some military authority, the 
Constitution’s exclusive delegation of war powers to the federal 
government supports the “alienation” of state immunity where those 
powers are exercised.139 
It appears beyond dispute that, in ratifying the Constitution, the 
 
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (holding that federal migratory bird treaty did 
not interfere with state’s Tenth Amendment rights because, although “the great body 
of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, . . . a treaty may 
override its power”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 629 (1889) 
(declining jurisdiction over act that prohibited certain aliens from entering the 
country because, in part, the federal political branches are “invested with power over 
all foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with 
other nations; all of which are forbidden to the state government”).  See generally G. 
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 138 See Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 392-93 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316-18; 
Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 1660 & n.184 (noting differing views on whether the 
states ever possessed foreign relations powers); Lofgren, supra note 127, at 32); see 
also Yoo, supra note 127, at 224-35 (discussing the war powers of pre-Articles of 
Confederation state legislatures and governors).  Moreover, scholars have questioned 
whether the need to exclude states from foreign affairs is still wise in the post-Cold 
War era.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1089 (1999); G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs 
Jurisprudence, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1999).  Finally, the Court’s reliance on the 
federal government’s “extra-constitutional” source of foreign powers has been 
criticized as well.  See, e.g., Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 392-93 (citing articles); Lofgren, 
supra note 127, at 32 (describing as “shockingly inaccurate” the Court’s holding that 
the federal government’s foreign affairs powers came from an extra-constitutional 
source); Swaine, supra note 136, at 1129-30 & n.1 (citing articles). 
 139 Velasquez noted also that even if it were true that the states’ sovereign powers 
never included war powers, it does not follow that “they surrendered any part of their 
sovereign immunity from a suit seeking money from the state treasury.  That immunity is an 
independent attribute of sovereignty rather than an incident of the war power or of 
any other governmental power that a state might or might not have.  The subject 
matter of the suit to which the defense of sovereign immunity is interposed is thus 
irrelevant.”  Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 393 (internal citations omitted).  Although 
Velasquez’s stress on states’ general immunity from private suits, as opposed to the 
subject matter of a given suit, is understandable given that Alden, Kimel, Garrett, and 
Hibbs had yet to be decided, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, its statement 
proves far too much.  Taken literally, Velasquez would dispense with Fourteenth 
Amendment abrogation as well, for nowhere in the Fourteenth Amendment is there 
an indication that states were surrendering their immunity.  See Nowak, supra note 
111, at 1458 (“There is no discussion in the debates of the ability of federal courts to 
entertain damage actions against state governments under the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment without congressional authorization.”).  Rather, as the Supreme 
Court has held, by limiting state actions and giving Congress enforcement power, the 
states implicitly surrendered their immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976). 
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states transferred whatever war powers they may have possessed to the 
federal government.  As one commentator has noted, “[o]ne of the 
primary and least controversial purposes of the Constitutional 
Convention was to strengthen the foreign relations powers of the 
federal government vis-à-vis the states.”140  Yet, that intent is not 
dispositive; under current law, the federal government’s exclusive 
authority in an area does not, by itself, permit abrogation of states’ 
immunity.141 
The transfer of war powers was remarkable, however, as the 
Constitution explicitly granted powers to the federal government, 
while barring state action absent express federal approval.  Thus, the 
Constitution not only delegated exclusive war powers authority to the 
federal government, but also, in the words of Hamilton, “prohibited 
the states from exercising the like authority.”142  Indeed, the war 
powers’ “alienation” of state immunity was confirmed by a relatively 
contemporary Supreme Court holding in 1824, when Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote that “[t]he powers of the Union, on the great subjects 
of war, peace, and commerce, and on many others, are in themselves 
limitations of the sovereignty of the States.”143  In short, by carving out 
state authority and delegating it to the federal government, the 
 
 140 Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 1643; see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 777 n.16 (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the main reasons a Constitutional Convention was 
necessary at all was that under the Articles of Confederation Congress lacked the 
effective capacity to bind the States.”); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND THE OLIVE BRANCH? 64-65 
(1981) (arguing, with respect to allocation of power between the President and 
Congress, that the Framers intended “Congress . . . to control most American 
decisions about war and peace,” but recognized the need for a “single command” 
while at war); Lofgren, supra note 127, at 16-17 (noting John Jay’s statement that the 
states had vested Congress with war powers “‘by express delegation of power’”) 
(citing 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 797-98 (1934) (Oct. 13, 1786)). 
 141 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. 
 142 See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also Peel v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 
600 F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding, pre-Seminole Tribe, that USERRA’s 
abrogation was valid because “‘[t]he war power of the federal government is its 
supreme power.  When it is in action it is transcendent’”) (quoting St. Johns River 
Shipbuilding Co. v. Adams, 164 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1947)); Jennings v. Ill. 
Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding, pre-Seminole Tribe, that 
USERRA’s abrogation was valid because “Congress was ‘exercising legislative 
authority that is plenary within the terms of the Constitutional (war powers) grant’”) 
(quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456). 
 143 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 382 (1821) (holding that the Court 
had jurisdiction over the state in an appeal from a state law conviction, where 
defendant used a federal act as a defense).  Obviously, the present Court has not 
followed Cohens in its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.  See Seminole Tribe, 
517 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Cohens held that the Eleventh 
Amendment’s intent was to limit federal jurisdiction over private suits seeking 
payment of state debts). 
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Constitution fundamentally changed the balance of state and federal 
war powers, echoing the change that would later occur under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.144  By its terms, therefore, the Constitution 
reveals that with regard to war powers, “there [was] a surrender . . . of 
immunity in the plan of the convention.”145 
The text of the Constitution plainly grants broad federal control 
over military affairs.  Under Article II, the President is “Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia 
of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States.”146  Moreover, Congress has the power under Article I to 
“provide for the common Defence,”147 to “declare War, grant Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water,”148 to “raise and support Armies,”149 to “provide and 
maintain a Navy,”150 to “make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”151 to “provide for calling 
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions,”152 and to “provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of 
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, 
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, 
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline 
 
 144 See Jennings, 589 F.2d at 938, 941-42; see also Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance 
Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 45 (2003) (recognizing, 
but ultimately rejecting, the theoretical plausibility of the argument that “in ceding 
some sovereignty with the Bankruptcy Clause, the states ceded their legislative 
powers but not their immunity from suit”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has long 
rejected attempts by states to hinder federal exercise of war powers by, for example, 
refusing to permit state militia members from participating in federal military 
exercises.  See, e.g., Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 351 (1990) (rejecting State 
of Minnesota’s attempt to prevent state National Guard members from participating 
in federal military training in Honduras because the militia clauses “recognize[] the 
supremacy of federal power in the area of military affairs” and “several constitutional 
provisions commit matters of foreign policy and military affairs to the exclusive 
control of the National Government”); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) 
(holding that state militia member could not refuse federal military service in the 
War of 1812). 
 145 Alden, 527 U.S. at 717 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 488 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 146 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 147 Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 148 Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 149 Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 150 Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 151 Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
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prescribed by Congress.”153  As noted, Article I provides not only 
positive federal war powers, but also expressly limits154 the states’ war 
powers: they are unable to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”155 
and “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . keep 
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, . . . or engage in War, 
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit 
of delay.”156 
Those war powers are striking in their expansive grant of power 
to the federal government and their express limitations on state 
power, which can generally be exercised only with Congress’s 
approval.  Indeed, that subordination of state power, although 
lacking an explicit enforcement clause, mirrors the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s allocation of authority between the federal and state 
governments. 
In Alden, the Court reemphasized the validity of Fourteenth 
Amendment abrogation in terms that apply equally well to federal 
war powers, while also invoking Hamilton’s alienations: “By imposing 
explicit limits on the powers of the States and granting Congress the 
power to enforce them, the Amendment ‘fundamentally altered the 
balance of state and federal power . . . .’”157  Accordingly, like the 
 
 153 Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 154 See Spiro, supra note 127, at 1228 (“The constitutional architecture itself 
evinces a norm of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs, on the one hand granting 
expansive foreign relations power to the federal government, on the other denying 
them to the states.”); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers 
Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1176 (1999) (“What the Constitution gives to the 
[federal] political branches, it explicitly takes from the states.”). 
 155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 156 Id., art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see also W. Taylor Reveley III, War Powers, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2117, 2121 (1983) (reviewing EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT 
ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (1982)) (stating that section 10, clause 3 “suggests 
that the Framers expected the states to bear the major burden of defense against 
sudden attack until Congress could act”). 
 157 Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59); see also Jennings, 
589 F.2d at 938, 941-42 (equating, in pre-Seminole Tribe case, USERRA’s war power 
abrogation to abrogation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. McVey 
Trucking, Inc. v. Sec’y of St. of Ill., 812 F.2d 311, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding, 
pre-Seminole Tribe, that Congress may abrogate state immunity under its bankruptcy 
powers, and rejecting theory that Fitzpatrick tied Fourteenth Amendment abrogation 
to explicit limits on state power because Congress’s “plenary” power necessarily limits 
state authority).  Fitzpatrick, however, also noted that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“[i]mpressed upon [the states] . . . duties with respect to their treatment of private 
individuals.”  Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453.  Although the war powers lack that nexus to 
private individuals, Fitzpatrick also recognized that “‘every addition of power to the 
general government involves a corresponding diminution of governmental powers of 
the States.  It is carved out of them.’”  Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (quoting Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880)).  So too did the Constitution transfer whatever 
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federal government’s exercise of its war powers, “[w]hen Congress 
enacts appropriate legislation to enforce [the Fourteenth 
Amendment], federal interests are paramount, and Congress may 
assert an authority over the States which would be otherwise 
unauthorized by the Constitution.”158 
The Constitution’s exclusive grant of war powers to the federal 
government, at the expense of state authority, also reflects the 
enormous importance of having a unified military policy.  As 
Hamilton recognized, to sufficiently exercise its war powers, the 
federal government must be able to prevent recalcitrant states from 
thwarting federal action through invocations of sovereign 
immunity.159  The Supreme Court, in another opinion by Chief Justice 
Marshall, affirmed the understanding that state war powers would be 
“contradictory and repugnant” to the exclusive federal war powers by 
holding that, under the Constitution, “the powers of sovereignty are 
 
war powers the states possessed to the federal government.  See Yoo, supra note 127, 
at 254-56. 
 158 Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (internal citations omitted); see also Case v. Bowles, 327 
U.S. 92, 102 (1946) (permitting Office of Price Administration to enjoin state timber 
sale because to hold otherwise would make “the Constitutional grant of the power to 
make war . . . inadequate to accomplish its full purpose.  And this result would impair 
a prime purpose of the federal government’s establishment”); Goldsmith, supra note 
127, at 1645 (arguing that the Constitution “ensured state compliance with the 
political branches’ foreign relations enactments.  But they left the determination of 
when the national foreign relations interest would be best served by the exclusion of 
state power largely to the discretion of the federal political branches”); Major 
Richard M. Lattimer, Jr., Myopic Federalism: The Public Trust Doctrine and Regulation of 
Military Activities, 150 MIL. L. REV. 79, 132-33 (1995) (arguing for negative war powers 
theory to prevent state regulation of military activities). 
 159 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985) 
(holding that Congress could impose minimum wage and overtime restrictions on 
states because they do not retain sovereign authority where the Constitution 
“divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal 
Government,” and specifically noting the Article I, section 8 powers of Congress, and 
Article I, section 10 restrictions on state power); Case, 327 U.S. at 102 (“To construe 
the Constitution as preventing [the federal government from regulating state land 
sales pursuant to its war powers] would be to read it as a self-defeating charter. . . .  
[T]he Tenth Amendment does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express 
or implied, delegated to the national government.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Cantwell v. County of San Mateo, 631 F.2d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that Congress did not violate the Tenth Amendment where VRRA 
conflicted with state statutes because the war powers are distinguishable from the 
commerce powers); Jennings, 589 F.2d at 938 (“[T]he power given to Congress to 
prosecute war ‘is not destroyed or impaired by any provision of the Constitution or 
by any one of the amendments.’”) (quoting Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 
781 (1948)); Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 1670 (“[T]he functional case for a self-
executing prohibition [through federal common law] on subnational foreign 
relations activity is strongest under [the] traditional concept[]” of foreign relations, 
such as military issues). 
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divided between the government of the Union, and those of the 
States.  They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects 
committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects 
committed to the other.”160 
Although the current Court, for the most part, has moved away 
from Marshall’s view of sovereignty, the importance of federal war 
powers should prove an exception.  The Court’s recent state 
abrogation holdings have centered on a concern that a “general 
federal power to authorize private suits for money damages would 
place unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to govern in 
accordance with the will of their citizens.”161  That concern, however, 
should not prevent the Court from acknowledging that the Founders 
and ratifying states did not contemplate the ability of states to 
undermine a uniform national defense and war policy by invoking 
sovereign immunity; the Constitution is not a “suicide pact.”162 
Despite its minor infringement on states’ freedom to allocate 
resources, USERRA’s abrogation is not a disproportionate attempt to 
address a trivial objective.  Rather, it narrowly targets state actions 
that directly impede the nation’s growing need to recruit and retain 
soldiers.  A low-level state manager, for example, may decide that 
compliance with USERRA, particularly where significant numbers of 
employees are called away for unforeseeable periods of time,163 is too 
costly.  Absent abrogation, that individual’s narrow self-interest can 
ignore the broader concerns of the nation as a whole—even when 
 
 160 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819), quoted in Alden, 
527 U.S. at 800 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 (“‘Supervision 
over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible 
except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United 
States.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 
(1938)). 
 161 Alden, 527 U.S. at 750-51 (emphasis added). 
 162 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963) (invalidating 
statute that divested citizenship of person who left country to avoid the draft, while 
recognizing that the “powers of Congress to require military service for the common 
defense are broad and far-reaching, for while the Constitution protects against 
invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact”); see also Case, 327 U.S. at 102; 
Schell v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, No. C-2-80-641, 1981 WL 2289, at *2-*3 (S.D. 
Ohio June 1, 1981) (holding, in pre-Seminole Tribe case, that the state employer had 
no Eleventh Amendment immunity from VRRA suit because “the responsibility of 
the national government to raise and support the military places the national 
government in a special position vis-à-vis the states,” therefore, “[d]ifferent policy 
considerations are raised by the Commerce and the War Powers Clauses . . . [and] 
our system of federalism requires greater deference to federal interests where the 
War Powers are involved”). 
 163 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
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those concerns involve areas as serious as military action.164  It is in 
such instances where the need for federal action is paramount and 
should trump individual states’ sovereignty interests.165 
In sum, although the Court’s explicit balancing of interests has 
consistently favored state immunity concerns over private 
enforcement of federal rights, Congress’s enactment of USERRA 
represents the apex of federal authority.  Accordingly, that statute’s 
war powers abrogation provides the best case for the Court to 
recognize a limited exception to its general disapproval of Article I 
abrogation. 
To be sure, when reviewing its statements that Congress cannot 
abrogate state immunity pursuant to Article I, the Court could hold 
that it meant what it said.166  Indeed, one fears, especially with regard 
to state sovereign immunity,167 that by merely repeating the Article I 
dicta enough, the Court will turn it into unassailable law.168  Such a 
 
 164 See, e.g., Wriggelsworth v. Brumbaugh, 129 F. Supp. 2d. 1106, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 
2001) (holding that state statute and pension plan at issue were preempted by 38 
U.S.C. § 4302 (2000), which provides uniform set of rights by expressly preempting 
any state law, collective-bargaining agreement, or certain other plans that limit 
USERRA’s protections); Meyler, supra note 111, at 104 (arguing that Congress, 
pursuant to War Powers and the Necessary and Proper clauses of the Constitution, 
should be able to require state employers to maintain hypothetical draftees’ 
employment seniority). 
 165 See Althouse, supra note 30, at 644 n.62 (“There is little, if any, recognizable 
normative value to the states’ ability to produce diverse [war powers] solutions 
tailored to local needs and preferences, as there is with the commerce power.”); 
Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 1677 (stating that traditional foreign relations matters, 
like military affairs, differ from nontraditional foreign relations matters in that 
federal-state concurrent authority over the latter is “much less likely to undermine 
the United States’ ability to participate in international affairs, and much less likely 
to harm the national foreign relations interest”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of 
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1495-1500 (1987) (discussing states’ 
check on the federal government’s military power through their ability to train 
militias under Congress’s prescriptions). 
 166 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 167 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (refusing to follow literal text of Eleventh 
Amendment because of its past holdings in, for example, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 
1 (1890), which held, in spite of the text of the amendment, that Eleventh 
Amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction over a private suit against a citizen’s own 
nonconsenting state). 
 168 The Court may be reversing course, however, as evidenced by its recent 
decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).  See 
supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.  In restating Seminole Tribe’s abrogation 
rule, the Court in Hibbs moved away from its practice of declaring that Congress 
cannot abrogate under any of its Article I powers, see supra note 94, to the subtly—
although perhaps significantly—different statement that “Congress may not abrogate 
the States’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I power over commerce.”  123 S. 
Ct. at 1977 (emphasis added).  Although it is too soon to tell whether that change 
portends a meaningful distinction, Hibbs supports the view that the Court will 
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holding, however, would require a shift away from Fitzpatrick and 
Alden, as well as an explanation why, under the plan of the 
Constitution, states expected to possess immunity against the federal 
government’s exercise of its extraordinarily broad war powers.  The 
Court is unlikely to put itself in that quandary, for even where it has 
expanded state immunity, it has been careful not to encroach upon 
the federal government’s war powers.  For example, although the 
Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery169 that Congress could 
not apply the FLSA to “core” state activities, it specifically noted that 
it was not overruling the holding of Case v. Bowles170—that Congress 
could enjoin state sales of timber under federal wartime price rules—
because “[n]othing we say in [Usery] addresses the scope of Congress’ 
authority under its war power.”171 
One could argue, as did the Seventh Circuit in Velasquez,172 that 
striking down USERRA’s abrogation would have little impact because 
relief against state employers is available under Ex parte Young173 suits, 
and in actions pursued by the federal government.174  As discussed 
 
recognize that its previous statements regarding Article I abrogation were too broad. 
 169 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 170 Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946). 
 171 Usery, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18; accord Cantwell v. County of San Mateo, 631 F.2d 
631, 636 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that USERRA’s abrogation did not violate states’ 
Tenth Amendment powers); Peel v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1083-84 
(5th Cir. 1979) (same).  Also, a question asked during oral argument by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in 1996 may indicate his openness to the idea that congressional authority 
over the states is greater during war than peace.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997) (holding that Congress’s attempt to make state officers carry out federal 
handgun purchase law violated the Tenth Amendment), Transcript of Oral 
Argument, 1996 WL 706933, at *39-*40 (Rehnquist, C.J., responding to Solicitor 
General’s argument that Congress had the power to make states assist in World War I 
effort by stating that “you would say there is some difference between wartime and 
peacetime as to congressional authority”). 
 172 See Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394. 
 173 See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. 
 174 See West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 n.4 (1987).  Velasquez also 
noted private parties’ ability to file an USERRA claim in state court—an alternative 
subsequently eliminated by Alden.  Moreover, in arguing that the need for war 
powers abrogation was not grave, the Velasquez court stated that because National 
Guards generally act as a state militia, the states have a substantial interest in 
protecting them.  See Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394.  It is not clear, however, that 
individual judgments whether to protect a military employee’s job, or whether to 
invoke sovereign immunity, will take into account the general benefit of the National 
Guard.  Indeed, that states have been not infrequently sued for such violations belies 
the value that they place on such protections.  Cf. Vazquez, Treaties, supra note 69, at 
741 & n.112 (noting that the Founders believed that “states could not be trusted to 
comply with their federal obligations without compulsion”) (citing THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 15, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
  
1034 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:999 
below, however, those alternatives, as well as actions under state law, 
do not sufficiently protect USERRA’s goals. 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO ENSURING STATE COMPLIANCE WITH USERRA 
One of the many points of contention between the majority and 
dissent in Seminole Tribe was the degree to which alternate means of 
enforcing federal rights would exist after the decision.175  That 
disagreement continued to play out in the Court’s subsequent 
holdings, where it repeatedly limited federal statutes’ application to 
the states.176  According to the majority, the remaining enforcement 
alternatives sufficiently protected federal rights, thereby allowing it to 
conclude that the “principle of sovereign immunity as reflected in 
our jurisprudence strikes the proper balance between the supremacy 
of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.”177 
The efficacy of alternate means to enforce USERRA is 
important, therefore, for those alternatives may be an implicit, if not 
explicit, factor in the Court’s examination of war powers abrogation.  
The Court will have to acknowledge that the need for a unified, 
national war policy is directly related to the ability of military 
employees to exercise their rights under USERRA; thus, it is likely to 
question whether sufficient alternative remedies exist should war 
powers abrogation be invalidated.  As shown below, the answer to that 
inquiry is that there are few, if any, suitable alternatives.  In 
particular, it appears that the equitable federal remedy generally 
available for most other statutes is not permitted under USERRA, and 
the alternatives that do exist fail adequately to protect the important 
policy needs underlying USERRA. 
A. Exceptions to State Sovereign Immunity 
1. Federal Suit Against a State Employer 
Even where a private individual is not permitted to sue a state for 
damages, it is well settled that states have no immunity against an 
action brought on the individual’s behalf by the federal 
 
 175 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 n.1 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that exclusively federal schemes such as copyright and 
bankruptcy will lack any remedy under the majority decision); id. at 72 n.16 
(responding to Justice Stevens by noting alternative remedies, including Ex parte 
Young actions). 
 176 See supra notes 35-59 and accompanying text. 
 177 Alden, 527 U.S. at 757. 
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government.178  USERRA explicitly allows for such an option, as 
individuals may ask the United States Secretary of Labor to seek 
enforcement against the state.179 
This option provides little more than false hope, however.  
Although the federal government may become involved in 
particularly significant cases,180 it lacks the resources to represent the 
vast majority of employees seeking to enforce their federal 
employment rights against a state employer, especially when war both 
strains the federal budget and increases the number of soldiers being 
called to active duty.181  USERRA’s statutory scheme, moreover, 
reflects Congress’s decision to encourage private enforcement of the 
Act.182  Accordingly, relying solely on potential federal enforcement 
not only undermines USERRA’s intent, but provides little hope for 
most military employees seeking monetary damages from a 
 
 178 See id. at 755-76; West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 312 n.4 (“States 
retain no sovereign immunity as against the Federal Government.”); United States v. 
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); United States v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 321 
F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2003) (reversing district court’s grant of the state’s motion seeking 
dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment of ADA suit brought by federal 
government); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
29 U.S.C. § 216 allows the Labor Department to bring FLSA suits on behalf of 
individuals). 
 179 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322(a)(2)(B), 4323, 4326 (2000); Klein & Cilenti, supra note 
74, at 17.  The Attorney General, however, must approve such suits.  See 38 U.S.C. §§ 
4322, 4323. 
 180 For example, after the Supreme Court, citing Seminole Tribe, vacated a Ninth 
Circuit decision allowing a class action ADEA suit against the California Public 
Employees Retirement System, the EEOC intervened and ultimately secured a $250 
million settlement.  See Joyce E. Cutler, Nation’s Largest Pension Plan to Pay $250 
Million to Settle Age Bias Charges, 21 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-9 to A-10 (Jan. 31, 
2003); see also Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Arnett, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000), vacating 179 
F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1999), remanded to No. 95-03022 CRB (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2003) 
(approving settlement). 
 181 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless Congress plans a 
significant expansion of the National Government’s litigating forces to provide a 
lawyer whenever private litigation is barred by today’s decision and Seminole Tribe, the 
allusion to enforcement of private rights by the National Government is probably not 
much more than whimsy.”); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 704 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress . . . might 
create a federal damages-collecting ‘enforcement’ bureaucracy charged with 
responsibilities that Congress would prefer to place in the hands of States or private 
citizens.”); BRIAN LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 211 n.1 (1997) (discussing the limited resources of the 
Justice Department’s Office of Civil Rights, and noting that “[m]ost federal law 
enforcement is given limited resources, perhaps because Congress sees 
underenforcement as less repugnant than overenforcement”); Dana Milbank, 
Spending Request Envisions Long War, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2003, at A1 (describing 
White House request for $74.7 billion for first six months of Iraqi conflict). 
 182 See 38 U.S.C. § 4323. 
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nonconsenting state employer.183 
2. Ex parte Young Action 
A further limited exception to a state’s claim of sovereign 
immunity is a private Ex parte Young184 action against a state official in 
federal court.  Ex parte Young essentially created a legal fiction: that a 
suit brought against a state officer is not considered a suit against the 
state that is susceptible to a sovereign immunity defense.185  However, 
Ex parte Young actions are limited to prospective relief, thereby 
barring money damages for successful plaintiffs.186  Although courts 
frequently rely on Ex parte Young relief to argue that abrogation is 
unnecessary to protect employees’ federal rights,187 it is unclear to 
what extent that claim is true. 
The prohibition against monetary relief is more than an 
inconvenience for state military employees.  Lawsuits are expensive, 
especially for an individual who is unemployed.  Although a state 
employer may be wary of a large class of plaintiffs, which is better able 
to spread the costs of an Ex parte Young suit, many individuals will 
have great difficulty affording litigation that will not achieve 
monetary damages.  Thus, states will often be able to violate USERRA 
without facing this type of suit. 
Moreover, even where an employee has the resources to sue, a 
state defendant is likely to delay resolution as long as possible.  The 
only potential harm from an Ex parte Young suit, aside from litigation 
costs and the rare negative publicity, is an order to stop breaking the 
 
 183 Further, as Justice Souter stated in his Garrett dissent, “the greater the obstacle 
the Eleventh Amendment poses to the creation by Congress of the kind of remedy at 
issue here—the decentralized remedy of private damage actions—the more 
Congress, seeking to cure important national problems . . . will have to rely on more 
uniform remedies, such as federal standards and court injunctions, which are 
sometimes draconian and typically more intrusive.”  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388 (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).  But see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (“The need for uniformity 
in the construction of patent law is undoubtedly important, but that is a factor which 
belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus, rather than to any determination of 
whether a state plea of sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property without 
due process of law.”). 
 184 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 185 See id. at 159-60; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89, 114 n.25 (1984) (noting fiction); Jackson, supra note 23, at 511. 
 186 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974); Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of 
State Police, 981 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (approving Ex parte Young 
relief for USERRA claim). 
 187 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 757; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14; Velasquez, 160 
F.3d at 394. 
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law in the future.  State defendants, therefore, have little incentive to 
settle even strong claims for Ex parte Young relief under USERRA.188 
In sum, a state employer has little reason not to disregard 
USERRA where, at worst, it will generally only have to reinstate or 
hire an employee.  That incentive, combined with the prohibitive 
costs of a lawsuit, leaves state military employees with little more than 
an empty promise of equitable relief.189  With its limited effect, Ex 
parte Young fails to stem the damage that state sovereign immunity 
claims inflict upon USERRA’s goal of promoting military service. 
Further, as discussed below,190 even the limited relief available 
under Ex parte Young may no longer be available under a 1998 
amendment to USERRA, which appears to have eliminated federal 
jurisdiction over all suits against state employers.  Thus, if war powers 
abrogation is invalidated, state military employees will be barred from 
pursuing any private USERRA claim against their employer. 
3. State Military Employment Statutes 
State legislation is one alternative that may provide USERRA-like 
rights to some state military employees.  Not surprisingly, there are 
significant disparities among the states,191 which undermine 
USERRA’s attempt to provide a consistent level of protection for 
military employees.192  More important, even among the states that 
have enacted statutes similar to USERRA, most are of no help to state 
military employees because they fail to permit private rights of action 
for monetary damages against the state. 
 
 188 But see Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394 (arguing that states have incentives to protect 
their own state militia and Reserve members). 
 189 See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Ex parte Young . . . is 
still available, though effective only where damages remedies are not important.”); 
Jackson, supra note 23.  Another potential problem with Ex parte Young relief is that 
Seminole Tribe further eroded the already limited nature of such actions by holding 
that they are not available “[w]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial 
scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right.”  Seminole 
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74.  Because USERRA does not appear to contain any remedial 
provisions detailed enough to proscribe Ex parte Young relief, Seminole Tribe’s holding 
in this area should not be a concern.  See also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 
261, 287 (1997) (refusing to permit Ex parte Young action in the “special 
circumstance[]” where the claim, for title to state submerged lands, would be as 
intrusive to state sovereignty as a claim for monetary damages). 
 190 See infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text. 
 191 See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text. 
 192 See Von Allmen v. Conn. Teachers Ret. Bd., 613 F.2d 356, 360 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“It is clear from the legislative history [of the 1974 amendments extending VRRA to 
the states] that Congress intended the amendments to produce uniformity from state 
to state . . . .”) (citing S. REP. No. 93-907, at 110 (1974)). 
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All states have some type of reemployment or leave of absence 
guarantees for state military employees called to active duty,193 
although the level of protection can vary dramatically.194  It is 
 
 193 See ALA. CODE § 31-2-13 (1998) (but see White v. Assoc. Indus. of Ala., Inc., 373 
So. 2d 616 (Ala. 1979) (holding statute unconstitutional against private employers)); 
ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.350 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-168(C) (2000 & Supp. 
2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-4-203, 21-4-212(b)(1), (d), (f)(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 
2003); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 395 to 395.03, 395.05, 395.1, 395.3, 395.4 (West 
1988 & Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50-301, 24-50-302, 28-3-601 to 28-3-608 
(2001 & Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-248, 5-255, 27-33 (1998 & Supp. 2003); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5105 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.01 to 115.15, 295.09 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-279 (1995 & Supp. 2003); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 79-20 (1993) (repealed July 1, 2002, by 2000 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 253,    
§ 132) (retaining the rights granted in the statue if comparable rights are not 
provided in collective-bargaining agreement or executive order); IDAHO CODE § 46-
407 (Michie 2003); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 325/1, 330/5 (West 1993); IND. CODE 
§ 10-2-4-3 (2003); IOWA CODE § 29A.28 (2001 & Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-
517 (Supp. 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.373, 61.377, 61.394 (Michie 1993 & 
Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:38 (West 1989 & Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 37-B, § 342(5)(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (amended by 2000 Me. Legis. 
Serv. 662) (including members of the federal reserves); MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. 
& PENS. §§ 2-701 to 2-707 (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 33, § 59 (1999) (providing 
leaves of absence, but no reemployment rights for public employees); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS §§ 35.352, 35.354 (2001); MINN. STAT. §§ 192.26, 192.261 (1992 & Supp. 2004); 
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-19, 33-1-21 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 36.370, 41.942, 
105.270 (2001 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-604, 10-2-221, 10-2-225 
(2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 55-160 (providing pay for up to 120 hours), 55-161 
(1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 281.145, 284.359 (2002 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 112:8, 112:9 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:23-1, 38:23-3, 38:23-4 (West 2002); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4-7, 28-15-1, 28-15-2 (Michie 1978); N.Y. MIL. LAW §§ 242, 243 
(McKinney 1990 & Supp. 2004) (providing up to 30 days paid, with escalator clause); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 127A-116, 127A-202, 127A-202.1, 127A-203 (2001); N.C. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 25, r.1E.0802 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 37-01-25, 37-01-25.1 (1987); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 124.29, 5903.01, 5903.02 (West 2003); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 123:1-
34-04 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 44, §§ 208.1, 209 (1996 & Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 399.230, 408.240, 408.290 (2001); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4102, 7304 (1976 & Supp. 
2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-5-2 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-20, 8-7-80, 8-7-90, 25-1-
2250 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3-6-19, 3-6-22, 3-6-24 
(Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-33-102, 8-33-104, 8-33-109 (2002 & Supp. 
2003); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 431.005, 613.001 to 613.006, 661.904 (Vernon 1998 
& Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-1, 39-3-2 (1998 & Supp. 2003); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 3, § 263 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-2901, 2.2-2903.1, 44-93, 44-93.1, 44-
204 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE  § 38.40.060 (2003); W. VA. CODE 
§§ 6-11-1, 15-1F-1 (2003); WIS. STAT. §§ 21.80, 230.32, 230.35(3)(a), 230.82 (2003); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-11-103, 19-11-106 to 19-11-108, 19-11-111 (Michie 2003). 
 194 For example, states differ in providing an “elevator” clause like USERRA.  See 
supra note 76 and accompanying text; compare, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-13 (providing 
elevator clause); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:38 (same); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-604, 
10-2-221, 10-2-225 (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 124.29, 5903.01, 5903.02 (same); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1 (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 263 (same), with ALASKA 
STAT. § 39.20.350 (lacking elevator clause); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50-301, 24-50-302, 
28-3-601 to 28-3-608 (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-15-2 (same); N.D. CENT. CODE     
§§ 37-01-25, 37-01-25.1 (same).  Similarly, states differ wildly in how much paid leave 
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questionable whether those protections are meaningful, however, 
because few states appear to allow private enforcement with monetary 
damages against the state employer.195  For most state military 
 
they provide, if any.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-13 (providing up to 168 hours paid); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-168(C) (providing 30 days); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-4-212 
(providing 30 days); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 395.01, 395.1, 395.3, 395.4 (providing 
180 days); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50-301, 24-50-302, 28-3-601 to 28-3-608 (providing 
no paid leave); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.01 to 115.15, 295.09 (providing 30 days); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 38-2-279 (providing 30 days); HAW. REV. STAT. § 79-20 (providing 15 
days); IND. CODE § 10-2-4-3 (providing 15 days); IOWA CODE § 29a.28 (providing 30 
days); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 33, § 59 (providing 17 days); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.270 
(providing 120 hours); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-1-604 (providing 15 days); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 55-160 (providing 120 hours); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.145 (providing 15 days); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112:9 (providing 15 days); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:23-1, 38:23-3, 
38:23-4 (providing 90 days for federal service, unlimited for state service); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 20-4-7 (providing 30 days); N.Y. MIL. LAW §§ 242, 243 (providing 30 days); 
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 123:1-34-04 (providing 22 days); OR. REV. STAT. § 408.290 
(providing 15 days); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4102 (providing 15 days); S.C. CODE ANN.  
§ 8-7-90 (providing 15 days); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3-6-19, 3-6-22 (stating that pay is 
at employer’s discretion); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-33-109 (providing 15 days); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 39-3-2 (providing 15 days); VA. CODE ANN. § 44-93.1 (stating that 
employer may supplement pay); WASH. REV. CODE  § 38.40.060 (providing 15 days); 
W. VA. CODE § 15-1F-1 (providing 30 days); WIS. STAT. § 230.35(3)(a) (providing 30 
days); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-111 (providing 15 days).  See generally Samuel W. 
Asbury, Comment, A Survey and Comparative Analysis of State Statutes Entitling Public 
Employees to Paid Military Leave, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 67 (1994) (discussing state paid leave 
statutes, although without looking to state immunity).  Other differences include 
provisions providing a period of time after which a returning employee can be 
terminated only for just cause, or penalties against violators of military employees’ 
rights.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-168 (stating that violation is a misdemeanor); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 115.15 (stating that violation is removal from office); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 342(5)(B) (stating that violation is a misdemeanor); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 33-1-21 (providing 1 year cause); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2-221, 10-2-
225 (providing up to 15 days paid, 1 year cause clause, and escalator clause); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 8-33-104 (providing 1 year cause); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 613.004 
(providing 1 year cause); UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1 (providing 1 year cause); WIS. 
STAT. § 21.80 (providing 180 days cause). 
 195 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 28-3-611 (allowing suit for damages against “any 
employer” that violates part of statute that protects public and private employees); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 905 (allowing suit for damages against “any employer” that 
violates relevant statutes); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 295.14 (allowing suit for damages 
available before court or state commission); IDAHO CODE § 46-407(d) (allowing suit 
for damages in violation of section that applies to any employer other than the 
federal government); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29:38(D), 29:38.3; MICH. COMP. LAWS    
§ 35.355; MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-1-226 (allowing state or private enforcement); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-15-3; OKLA. STAT. tit. 44, § 208.1 (adopting USERRA, including its 
provision for private enforcement against state, 38 U.S.C. § 4323); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 8-33-107; UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1(5); VA. CODE ANN. § 44-93.5; WYO. STAT. ANN.    
§ 19-11-121), with NEB. REV. STAT. § 55-161 (adopting much of USERRA, but not its 
private right of enforcement provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4323); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.    
§§ 431.006 (providing monetary damages only for private employees), 613.021 to 
613.023 (providing only equitable relief for public employees); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS   
§ 3-6-25 (providing only private enforcement to obtain equitable relief).  Some of 
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employees, therefore, the right to a leave of absence or 
reemployment is no better than equitable Ex parte Young relief 
obtained under USERRA.196 
Moreover, only thirteen states197 prohibit military-based 
 
these states, and others, also provide for state enforcement of leave and employment 
rights, with varying remedies, against state employers.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-
517(d), (f) (stating that state can prosecute on individual’s behalf); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 35.355 (stating that state enforcement preferred, but permits private 
enforcement); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-1-21(b) (stating that district attorney can 
enforce leave of absence protection); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-1-226 (allowing state or 
private enforcement); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-15-3 (allowing state or private 
enforcement for damages); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 127A-202.1 (allowing state 
enforcement), 127A-203 (allowing monetary award for reemployment for state guard 
members); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.29 (providing state administrative 
enforcement scheme); OR. REV. STAT. § 399.235 (providing state administrative 
enforcement scheme); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-33-106 (stating that it can be enforced 
by Commissioner of Personnel, in addition to private suit); WIS. STAT. § 21.80(7) 
(allowing state to enforce with damages). 
 196 See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.  Moreover, even where a private 
right of action is provided, it may not be helpful without also providing attorney fees.  
See Asbury, supra note 194, at 92 (arguing that states should permit attorney fees for 
military employees’ suits to obtain guaranteed paid leave because the damages 
involved will often not otherwise make a lawsuit economically feasible). 
 197 See CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 394(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 342(5) 
(amended by Me. Legis. Serv. 662 (2000)) (including members of the federal 
reserves); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.270; NEB. REV. STAT. § 55-161 (adopting USERRA); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 412.606 (prohibiting discrimination against state guard); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 110-B:65 (prohibiting discrimination against guard members); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5, 10:5-12; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 127B-12; OKLA. STAT. tit. 44, § 208.1 
(adopting USERRA “as state law,” which includes state employers); 51 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 7301-7309; UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1 (preventing only discrimination against 
employees who return to work after military service); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.32, 111.321, 
111.322; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-11-103, 19-11-104.  New York does prohibit prejudice 
against an employee because of an absence required by military service; however, 
that protection is best described as a reemployment right.  See N.Y. MIL. LAW § 242 
(protecting against “prejudice[], by reason of [a military duty] absence, with 
reference to continuance in office or employment, reappointment to office, re-
employment, reinstatement, transfer or promotion”); Kitsakos v. Brown, 848 F. Supp. 
459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that N.Y. MIL. LAW § 243 applies “only where 
employment would not have been terminated by any intervening cause apart from 
absence due to military duty”); Hogan v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 496 
N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that refusal to hire or discrimination not 
actionable under Section 242 unless related to specific absence). 
Seventeen other states have antidiscrimination laws, but do not explicitly apply 
them to state employers.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-167; COLO. REV. STAT. § 28-3-506; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571; 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 1805/100, 705 § 505/8, 745   
§ 5/1; IOWA CODE § 29A.43 (providing no definition of “employer,” but held to 
include municipal employees in Bewley v. Villisca, 200 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1980)); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1126, 44-1002 (defining “person” as not including state); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 29:38.1 (failing to include state employer, as reemployment does); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 33 § 13; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 192.34; MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-1-15; 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-603, 10-1-615 (stating that violation is a misdemeanor); 
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discrimination against state employees.198  As with leave and 
reemployment statutes, those state anti-discrimination provisions are 
undermined by the failure of most states to provide for private 
enforcement with monetary damages against the state employer.199 
 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-6 (stating that willful violation is a misdemeanor); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 36-11-2, 36-11-6; TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1-604; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 491; VA. 
CODE ANN. § 44-93.4 (failing to mention state employee, like leave reemployment 
statutes do); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 38.40.040, 38.40.050. 
 198 States may obviously differ in what they recognize as a valid waiver of immunity 
against a private suit, but it is assumed that state courts will not find such a waiver 
unless clearly expressed by the legislature.  See, e.g., Amantia v. Cantwell, 213 A.2d 
251, 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to 
monetary remedy for violation of paid leave statute, but that it could not mandate 
payment because permitting monetary remedies against the state is exclusively within 
the legislature’s discretion).  Thus, it is also assumed that a statute providing rights to 
a military employee will be applicable against a state employer only if there exists an 
“express waiver,” as is required for federal jurisdiction over such suits.  Alden, 527 
U.S. at 724 (“The handful of state statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing 
suits or petitions of right against States only confirms the prevalence of the 
traditional understanding that a State could not be sued in the absence of an express 
waiver, for if the understanding were otherwise, the provisions would have been 
unnecessary.”).  See generally Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: 
Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1102-
05 (2002) (discussing enforcement of state disability laws against state actors).  
Indeed, waivers under state legislation may apply to a federal USERRA suit as well, 
for at least one state has held that a legislature’s enactment of a statute allowing 
private money damages against the state also constitutes a waiver of sovereign 
immunity under a federal statute that provides the same rights.  See Williamson v. 
Dep’t of Human Res., 572 S.E.2d 678, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that waiver 
of immunity under state statute prohibiting disability discrimination constituted 
waiver under the ADA). 
 199 Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 110-B:65 (providing specifically for money 
damages against the state); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-13, 10:5-38 (providing state or 
private enforcement of damage suit); UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1 (providing private 
right to enforce only for discrimination against returning employees); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 19-11-121, with NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 55-161, 55-161.01 (adopting USERRA’s 
protections for public employees, but only the Commissioner of Labor can enforce 
statute and obtain monetary damages; does not adopt USERRA’s private right of 
enforcement provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4323); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 127A-203, 127B-12 
(allowing private suit for damages only for reemployment claims); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 7301-7309, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521-8522 (lacking a waiver of sovereign 
immunity); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.375, 111.39 (only state may seek backpay). 
Many states make violations of antidiscrimination laws a crime.  See CAL. MIL. & 
VET. CODE § 394(g); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29a.43 (failing to clearly prohibit 
discrimination in hire); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 37-B § 342(5); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.270 
(stating that violation is a misdemeanor; no prohibition against refusal to hire); NEB. 
REV. STAT.   § 55-165 (stating that violation is a misdemeanor); NEV. REV. STAT.          
§ 412.606 (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 110-B:65; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 127B-13 
(same).  However, making discrimination a crime does little, if anything, for state 
military employees, as it is unlikely that a state attorney general or local prosecutor 
has the power, or will, to charge a state agency with a crime.  See Colker & Milani, 
supra note 198, at 1104 (discussing Alabama law). 
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Accordingly, state military employees in the vast majority of 
states can enforce their rights only at a potentially significant 
financial burden.200  Additional problems arise from the perception 
that state courts are more hostile than federal courts to claims against 
their own state,201 and that state litigation may involve more 
substantial delays.202 
Further, the significant number of states that provide the right 
to a leave of absence and reemployment, but fail to prohibit 
discrimination with regard to hiring, creates a perverse incentive for a 
state employer.  A manager will be faced with potentially severe 
problems associated with hiring a military employee, including 
increased leave time and serious health problems that may result 
from active duty.203  Many managers, therefore, may simply avoid 
taking on such burdens by refusing to hire members of the Reserves 
or National Guard.  In the vast majority of states, those employers can 
easily discriminate against such applicants, fearing only the potential 
of future equitable relief.204 
Although a few states provide their employees with rights as 
expansive as USERRA, the majority do not.  Military employees of 
most states, therefore, are no better off than they would be merely 
seeking Ex parte Young relief.  Accordingly, state legislation does not 
provide an adequate safety net for Congress’s attempt to encourage 
military service should the Supreme Court invalidate USERRA’s 
abrogation of state immunity.205 
 
 200 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text. 
 201 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-31 (1977) 
(arguing that state courts are generally less open to plaintiffs seeking to exercise 
their rights); Kathryn S. Piscitelli, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: Can State 
Employees Still Sue in Federal Court?, 43 LAB. L.J. 213, 216 (1996) (predicting that “state 
courts will probably be less generous than federal courts in awarding damages 
against a state”). 
 202 See, e.g., Hehr & Wallace, supra note 120, at 55 n.115 (noting disadvantages of 
suing in state courts); John A. Martin & Nancy C. Maron, Courts, Delay, and 
Interorganizational Networks: Managing an Essential Tension, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 268 (1991) 
(addressing delays in state litigation). 
 203 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; see also David Brown, U.S. Acts to 
Avert Gulf War Malady; Military Readies Military Tracking System and Better Sensors, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at A1 (noting that approximately 160,000 soldiers may have 
suffered “lingering physical symptoms” after the 1991 Gulf War). 
 204 Although some states make discrimination a crime, none appears to permit 
prosecution of state officials.  See supra note 199. 
 205 The lack of protection for military employees in most states also raises the 
possibility of a more attenuated alternative—due process abrogation.  Under this 
theory, Congress may abrogate state immunity pursuant to its due process power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (holding that 
Congress can abrogate pursuant to a valid exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment 
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4. State Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
Finally, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that a State’s 
sovereign immunity is ‘a personal privilege which it may waive at 
pleasure.’”206  To create such a waiver, a state must have voluntarily 
submitted to federal jurisdiction, or made a “clear declaration” that it 
intends to submit to such jurisdiction.207 
In College Savings Bank,208 however, the Court limited the ability 
of courts to find a waiver.  The previous rule was that implicit or 
constructive waivers—for example, a court finding a waiver of state 
immunity based on a state’s operation of an interstate railroad209—
were permissible.  The Court in College Savings Bank changed course 
 
power); Vazquez, supra note 12, at 1745-63 (describing “abrogation reductio”); see 
also Jackson, supra note 23, at 507-10 & nn.53-58; Meltzer, supra note 12, at 49-50 & 
nn.230-32.  In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), the Court recognized the possibility of due process 
abrogation, but placed great doubts on Congress’s ability to satisfy the balance 
between due process protections and state immunity.  Florida Prepaid involved a 
patent infringement suit brought against the State of Florida.  See id. at 630-32.  In 
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C.             
§§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000), Congress abrogated state immunity against patent suits 
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment due process power.  See Florida Prepaid, 527 
U.S. at 637.  The Court expressly acknowledged that due process abrogation could 
be valid, see id. at 642; however, it held that the abrogation was not congruent and 
proportional to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power because there was no 
evidence of a pattern of state due process violations, such as patent violations, 
without providing some means of redress.  Id. at 644-46 (noting also that a due 
process violation must be intentional or reckless). 
Assuming that USERRA’s protections can be considered a grant of property 
rights to military employees—which is unlikely given that Congress never cited its 
due process, or any Fourteenth Amendment power with reference to the Act, see 
supra note 102—Florida Prepaid raises several interesting issues.  For example, 
Congress has protected military employees since 1940, see supra note 70, and until 
Seminole Tribe, states would have considered themselves liable to individual suits.  
Given that a pattern of state violations without due process protection would 
obviously be lacking, would the Court require a period where states take advantage 
of their immunity by violating USERRA rights without due process before holding 
that Congress can validly abrogate state immunity to protect those same rights?  
Moreover, although some state laws would protect the hypothetical USERRA 
property rights, others would not.  See supra notes 189-99 and accompanying text.  
Would the Court hold that USERRA’s abrogation was valid with regard to some 
states, but not others?  Its analysis in other cases suggests that it would not make such 
a targeted ruling, but one could question why a statute’s abrogation would be void 
even though it was valid in some circumstances.  See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927 (2000). 
 206 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
675 (1999) (quoting Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)). 
 207 Id. 
 208 527 U.S. at 680. 
 209 Id. 
  
1044 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:999 
and held that “a State’s express waiver of sovereign immunity [must] 
be unequivocal.”210  Thus, if war powers abrogation is 
unconstitutional, a state must explicitly waive its immunity for a 
private USERRA suit for monetary damages to be available. 
An aggrieved employee will have few means, save perhaps public 
opinion, to force a state to waive its immunity.211  Yet, Congress 
possesses an easy method of obtaining state waivers.  As it has done in 
other areas,212 Congress may require states to expressly waive their 
immunity against USERRA suits in exchange for related federal 
money, such as National Guard funding.213  Indeed, the Court has 
recently reemphasized Congress’s ability to obtain such conditional 
waivers.214 
Given its recent attempts to amend USERRA,215 this route 
provides Congress with a simple and relatively quick means of 
reestablishing national protections for military employees.216  It must 
proceed carefully, however.  Although tying waivers of immunity to 
the acceptance of funds is generally permissible, Congress’s “bribe” 
cannot be so coercive as to threaten states’ ability to engage in lawful 
activities if they choose not to accept the conditional funds.217  
 
 210 See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
 211 See Helen Irvin, A Few States Respond to Garrett Decision, Consider Waiving 
Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 119 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at C-1 (June 21, 2001) (noting 
state bills to waive sovereign immunity against disability discrimination suits). 
 212 See infra note 214. 
 213 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Congress can tie 
funding to adoption of minimum drinking age laws); Hehr & Wallace, supra note 
120, at 57-58; see also Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
793, 823-27 (1998) (discussing general restrictions on conditional waivers); Vazquez, 
supra note 12, at 1707.  See generally Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Spending and the 
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987). 
 214 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. 203); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 
686.  See generally Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and 
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 172-82 (2002). 
 215 See infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.  As noted below, Congress’s most 
recent amendment may have inadvertently eliminated federal jurisdiction even 
where a state has consented to suit.  See infra notes 221-44 and accompanying text.  
Any legislation seeking to obtain conditional waivers, therefore, should also make 
clear that the federal courts have jurisdiction over private suits against state 
employers. 
 216 See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001, S. 1611, 
107th Cong. (2001) (bill permitting states to obtain money damages for violations of 
their own patents only if they waive sovereign immunity for suits against state 
violations of private patents). 
 217 See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686; Althouse, supra note 30, at 664-65 (“[T]he 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at 
which pressure turns into compulsion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of 
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Congress cannot impose waiver on states; rather, a state must 
voluntarily waive its immunity.218 
Notwithstanding this limitation, it should be easy for Congress to 
avoid an overly coercive waiver.  The federal government already 
provides a significant amount of money to encourage state 
employment of military employees,219 and linking a USERRA waiver of 
immunity to such funds would be valid.220  Despite its simplicity, this 
conditional wavier could prove invaluable to state military employees 
who would otherwise face discrimination or the loss of their jobs 
without monetary relief. 
B. USERRA’s Amendment and Its Impact on the State Sovereign 
Immunity Exceptions 
One additional complication for state military employees could 
prove quite significant.  Congress, in a surprisingly quick response221 
to Seminole Tribe, attempted to ensure that USERRA would continue 
to cover state employers.  In the Veterans Programs Enhancement 
Act of 1998 (“Amendment”),222 Congress amended USERRA to 
 
Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1373-79 (2001) 
(discussing possible limits of conditional spending waivers, as expressed in South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).  But see Kinports, supra note 213, at 827 (arguing 
that this limitation refers only to the amount of money, not the “string” attached).  
An extreme example would be a condition that states waive their immunity under 
USERRA to receive federal protection in case of an invasion. 
 218 See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[P]erhaps Congress 
will be able to achieve the results it seeks . . . by embodying the necessary state 
‘waivers’ in federal funding programs—in which case, the Court’s decisions simply 
impose upon Congress the burden of rewriting legislation, for no apparent 
reason.”).  Moreover, conditional waivers could be more difficult in the few states 
that cannot waive their immunity absent a constitutional amendment.  See infra notes 
238-42 and accompanying text; see also John H. Clough, Federalism: The Imprecise 
Calculus of Dual Sovereignty, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 29-32 (2001) (discussing 
requirement that state waiver of immunity comply with state law); Meltzer, supra note 
217, at 1331, 1386 n.186 (2001) (“It may be that in a small number of states waiver 
can be effected only through constitutional amendment.”) (citing Beasley v. Ala. 
State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1322-25 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that, in spite of 
rule that the legislature cannot waive immunity, waiver may occur through accepting 
“bribery” funds by the federal government); Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs. v. Graf, 516 
S.E.2d 741, 745 (W. Va. 1998) (holding, in case not addressing conditional waiver, 
that under the state constitution, the legislature lacks power to waive state sovereign 
immunity)). 
 219 See, e.g., Jobs for Veterans Act, Pub. L. No. 107-288, 116 Stat. 2033 (2002) 
(increasing funding to states to find employment for veterans). 
 220 See infra note 242. 
 221 See 144 CONG. REC. H1396, H1398 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Filner) (noting that, “after the problem was identified, we came up with the 
consensus rather quickly to solve it for the men and women in our armed forces”). 
 222 Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 211, 112 Stat. 3315, 3329-31 (1998). 
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declare that federal courts “shall have jurisdiction” over an action 
brought against a state by the federal government, and that “[i]n the 
case of an action against a state (as an employer) by a person, the 
action may be brought in a State court of competent jurisdiction in 
accordance with the laws of the State.”223 
The Amendment relied, in part, on the principle that, under the 
Supremacy Clause, state courts must enforce federal law.  As 
discussed, however, Alden soon eliminated that doctrine, making 
Congress’s attempt to provide a state forum for USERRA actions 
futile.224  In perhaps a greater affront, that attempt may have even 
further limited military employees’ ability to pursue USERRA claims 
by also eliminating all federal jurisdiction over private suits against a 
state employer—including those brought under Ex parte Young or 
against a state that has waived its immunity. 
That inadvertent harm is illustrated by the subsequent history of 
the Seventh Circuit’s Velasquez decision,225 which issued one day after 
the Amendment was enacted.226  After the court became aware of the 
enactment, it vacated its original decision, which held that Congress 
lacked the power to abrogate state immunity under USERRA, and 
examined the Amendment’s effect on the plaintiff’s USERRA action.  
Chief Judge Posner, writing again for the court, dismissed the action 
for lack of jurisdiction because the Amendment mandated that 
private USERRA claims against state employers can be heard only in 
state courts.227 
Velasquez’s interpretation of the Amendment may appear 
puzzling at first.  The language of the Amendment itself is 
ambiguous, for it declares only that a military employee may sue in 
state court, not that a claim must be brought in such a forum.228  
Congress’s grant of jurisdiction over suits brought by the federal 
government on an individual’s behalf was much stronger, stating that 
federal courts “shall” have jurisdiction over such actions.229  The use 
of “may,” therefore, could indicate that Congress was merely 
 
 223 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b) (2000).  This change was to apply to all pending actions.  
See id. § 4323(a); Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health, No. Civ. A. 97-W-1536-N, 1999 
WL 33100500, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 1999). 
 224 See supra notes 106-19 and accompanying text. 
 225 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
 226 The Amendment became effective the same day.  See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(a). 
 227 See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 165 F.3d 593, 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (Velasquez II); see 
also Larkins, 1999 WL 33100500, at *2 (relying on Velasquez II to hold that the 
Amendment deprived federal jurisdiction over claims against states). 
 228 See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2). 
 229 See id. § 4323(b)(1). 
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providing another jurisdictional option—particularly when examined 
under the rule that USERRA is to be construed liberally in favor of 
military employees.230 
The contrary interpretation is not without support, however.  
First, the language at issue is in a subsection entitled “Jurisdiction,” 
which addresses three types of actions: (1) a suit brought against a 
state or private employer by the federal government, over which the 
federal courts “shall have jurisdiction”; (2) a private suit against a 
state employer, which “may be brought” in state court; and (3) a 
private action against a private employer, over which the federal 
courts “shall have jurisdiction.”231  The subsection appears to be 
comprehensive, except for suits against the federal government,232 
and provides no evidence that it intended private actions against 
states to be heard anywhere except in state court.  Indeed, the 
statement that such a suit “may” be brought in state court can be 
explained by the constraint that such suits are permissible only “in 
accordance with the laws of the State.”233  The failure to declare that 
states “shall” have jurisdiction over such claims may simply be a 
recognition that Congress has limited authority to dictate state 
courts’ jurisdiction. 
Second, the Amendment’s limited legislative history suggests 
that Congress’s answer to Seminole Tribe was only to permit the federal 
government to pursue suits on behalf of individuals in federal court 
and to allow private suits against state employers in state court.  
Representative Evans provided a typical explanation of the 
Amendment, stating that it “would substitute the United States for an 
individual . . . where the Attorney General believes that a State has 
not complied with USERRA. . . .  Individuals not represented by the 
Attorney General would be able to bring enforcement actions in State 
court.”234  There is little in the legislative history to suggest that 
 
 230 See supra note 85; see also Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584 (1977) 
(discussing VRRA).  However, it is also true that statutes granting jurisdiction, 
especially where state sovereign immunity is implicated, should be construed 
narrowly.  See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (“The test 
for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court 
jurisdiction is a stringent one.”). 
 231 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(1), (2), (3). 
 232 See id. §§ 4324, 4325. 
 233 Id. § 4323(b)(3). 
 234 144 CONG. REC. H1396, H1398 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Evans); see also id. at H1397-98 (statement of Rep. Evans) (stating that the 
Amendment provides “the federal government with a means of enforcing service 
members’ employment and re-employment rights in federal court,” which “assures 
that the federal government’s interest in protecting . . . military personnel can be 
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Congress sought to provide federal and state jurisdiction over private 
claims against states.235  Such an intent, even ignoring Alden’s 
subsequent bar to state court suits, is troubling.  It means that 
Congress, in an amendment seeking to expand USERRA rights, also 
restricted those rights by eliminating both Ex parte Young relief236 and 
federal jurisdiction where a state waives its immunity. 
Nevertheless, if the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is accepted, 
a state military employee will have to rely solely on state law or federal 
prosecution of USERRA, unless war powers abrogation is accepted.237  
The consequence of that outcome is amply illustrated by Larkins v. 
Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, in which a USERRA 
claim was dismissed from federal court based on the state employer’s 
sovereign immunity.238  After the plaintiff refiled his claim in state 
court, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that Congress lacked the 
power to abrogate under USERRA, but that the Act’s grant of 
jurisdiction to state courts was arguably constitutional under Alden 
because jurisdiction existed only “in accordance with the laws of the 
State.”239  However, the court then examined whether Alabama law 
permitted USERRA suits against the state, and concluded that it did 
not.240  Under Alabama’s constitution, the state “shall never be made 
a defendant in any court of law or equity.”241  That immunity cannot 
 
fully exercised in those cases where the employer is a State government”); 144 CONG. 
REC. S12,918, S12,934 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) 
(stating that the Amendment “would substitute the United States for an individual 
veteran as the plaintiff in cases where the Attorney General believes that a State has 
not complied with USERRA.  This restores the ability of veterans who are employed 
by a state agency to seek redress for violations of their reemployment rights”). 
 235 But see 144 CONG. REC. H10,389, H10,391 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1998) (statement 
of Rep. Evans) (“For more than 50 years, Federal law has provided protection for 
members of the uniformed services . . . [including] the right to bring an action 
against a state or private employer in federal court. . . .  This bill restores the 
protections and remedies for state employees that existed prior to the Seminole Tribe 
decision . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 236 One could argue that Ex parte Young relief is still available, because an action 
against a state official is not one against the state.  However, as noted, section 4323’s 
grant of jurisdiction covers only private suits against a “State (as an employer)” or a 
“private employer.”  An Ex parte Young action is clearly not one against a private 
employer, so it either constitutes a suit against a state, or something else entirely, in 
which case the statute provides no jurisdiction. 
 237 See Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 
361-63 (Ala. 2001) (Larkins II) (holding that under Alden, the state is not liable for 
USERRA claim in state court); Hehr & Wallace, supra note 120, at 55. 
 238 See Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health, No. Civ. A. 97-W-1536-N, 1999 WL 
33100500, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 1999) (Larkins I). 
 239 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2) (2000); Larkins II, 806 So. 2d at 363. 
 240 See Larkins II, 806 So. 2d at 363. 
 241 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; Larkins II, 806 So. 2d at 363.  Indeed, under Alden, all 
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be waived by “the Legislature or by any other state authority,” and 
state courts lack jurisdiction over any action that is contrary to the 
state’s immunity.242  Accordingly, Alabama could not be held liable 
under USERRA unless it amended its constitution to allow such 
claims. 
The potential elimination of federal jurisdiction—and, as Larkins 
and Alden demonstrate, probably state jurisdiction as well—
underscores the need for Congress to amend USERRA to ensure a 
forum for claims against all state employers.243  One irony is that the 
statute in its present form could help state military employees bring 
USERRA suits in state court.  In Alden, as it has elsewhere, the 
Supreme Court relied in part on the availability of Ex parte Young 
relief in holding that Congress could not abrogate the state’s 
immunity in its own courts.244  The elimination of that alternative may 
provide an additional ground for concluding that USERRA’s 
abrogation constitutes an exception to the general prohibition 
against abrogation under Article I. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s burgeoning state sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence has significantly affected state employees, who have 
lost the ability to pursue private claims for damages against their 
nonconsenting state employers in a variety of federal employment 
statutes.  Although the interests of those employees, and the nation, 
in ensuring state compliance are significant, they may pale in 
comparison to the national concerns embodied in USERRA.  The 
need to encourage participation in the armed forces is always 
important, yet rarely is it so vital as when the nation is consumed with 
military needs both abroad and at home.245  That concern is not a 
mere matter of public policy, for it also directly implicates the Court’s 
 
states have such immunity unless expressly waived. 
 242 Larkins II, 806 So. 2d at 363 (citing Ala. State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 
So. 2d 432, 434-35 (Ala. 2001); Druid City Hosp. Bd. v. Epperson, 378 So. 2d 696 
(Ala. 1979)). 
 243 See infra note 246. 
 244 See supra note 187. 
 245 See Vernon Loeb & Thomas E. Ricks, For Army, Fears of Postwar Strife, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting that the Army had fallen short of its reserve 
recruiting goals in January and February 2003 because of increasingly long 
deployments); see also Eric Schmitt, Soft Economy Aids Army Recruiting Effort, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2003, at A1 (stating that the weak economy allowed all of the armed services 
to meet their recruiting goals for fiscal year 2003, but that military officials expected 
difficulties in the future because of the Iraq conflict—particularly for enrollment in 
the National Guard and Reserves). 
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abrogation analysis. 
The Court’s explicit balancing of interests has generally weighed 
in favor of state immunity over congressional attempts to abrogate 
that immunity.  War powers abrogation, however, may represent a 
stopping point.  The desire for uniform, national war powers was a 
critical goal of the Constitutional Convention.  War powers, 
therefore, not only provides an important policy consideration for 
the Court, but also constitutes a limited area in which the states did 
not expect to retain immunity where the federal government acted. 
That conclusion holds even in the face of the Court’s broad 
dicta stating that Congress can never abrogate state immunity under 
Article I.  The Court has never addressed abrogation under 
Congress’s war powers; thus, its dicta fail to acknowledge the 
exceptional nature of those powers.  The understanding of the 
Founders, the Court’s holdings with regard to states’ war powers, and 
the Constitution’s extraordinary grant of power to the federal 
government vis-à-vis the states, all provide compelling evidence, even 
under the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence, that war powers 
abrogation is valid. 
Should the Court strike down USERRA’s war powers abrogation, 
however, state military employees have few options that adequately 
protect the rights underlying the Act.  The Court’s own exceptions—
claims brought by the federal government or those seeking only Ex 
parte Young relief—are inadequate, and the vast majority of states do 
not permit private suits for monetary damages in their own 
legislation.  Congress does have one relatively simple option: it can 
require states to waive their immunity against USERRA claims in 
exchange for related federal funding.  Such legislation, which could 
also amend USERRA to make clear that federal courts have 
jurisdiction over suits brought by state employees, would fully protect 
the goals of USERRA by once again bringing state employers under 
its reach.246  By doing so, Congress could circumvent the threat to 
 
 246 Following informal distributions of an earlier version of this Article, several 
Democratic senators introduced a bill that, among numerous other changes, would 
amend USERRA as this Article recommends.  See Fairness and Individual Rights 
Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004, S. 2088, 108th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 2004) (permitting, for example, private rights of action under Title VI and 
IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, allowing punitive damages under the ADA, and 
creating a conditional waiver of state immunity under FLSA, ADA, ADEA, Title VI, 
and Title IX).  The Fairness Act would grant federal jurisdiction over private 
USERRA claims brought against states and would condition receipt of federal funds 
on states’ waiver of sovereign immunity against USERRA claims.  See id. § 201(b)(2) 
(“In the case of an action against a State (as an employer) by a person, the action 
may be brought in a district court of the United States or State court of competent 
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USERRA raised by the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence and 
reassert its judgment that the nation’s military readiness requires that 
all soldiers—even those who work, or seek to work, for state 
employers—be able to serve in the military without impairing their 
civilian employment opportunities. 
 
 
jurisdiction.”); id. § 201(b)(3) (“A State’s receipt or use of Federal financial 
assistance for any program or activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign 
immunity, under the 11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit 
brought by an employee of that program or activity under this chapter for the rights 
or benefits authorized the employee by this chapter.”). 
